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 Abstract 
The 2011 Arab Spring Revolutions across the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region 
drew international attention to the collection action phenomenon of revolutions.  Despite having 
a significant impact on today’s globalized world, revolutions have been widely unexplored by 
social movement rhetorical scholars.  This lack of study has prompted scholars to call for the 
investigation of the role human agency plays during revolutions (Morris, 2000). Rhetorical 
scholars are well-suited to meet this call but lack a methodological framework to examine 
revolutions.  In responding to Morris’ call and with an interest in adding to the body of rhetorical 
social movement literature, this thesis asks two research questions. What are the rhetorical 
characteristics of revolutions? Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements? To 
answer these questions, this thesis translates Jack Goldstone’s (1998) Divergent View of Social 
Movements and Revolutions into a rhetorical model for studying revolutions.  This adaptation of 
the political science model relies heavily on Leland Griffin’s (1969) and Charles Stewart’s 
(1980) models of social movements.  Additionally, the adapted model also incorporates James 
Wilkinson’s (1989) discussion of revolutionary rhetorical functions.  The application of the new 
rhetorical model to the Egyptian Arab Spring reveals revolutions rhetorically develop and 
function in ways that creates a clear distinction between revolutions from social movements.  
These findings prompt discussion of methodological and critical implications. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction & Rationale 
In late 2010 and early 2011 the world witnessed the Arab Spring.  Within a relatively 
short span of time a historically unprecedented number of pro-democracy uprisings spread across 
the Middle East Northern Africa (MENA) region.  Many of these uprisings originated out of 
similar social, economic and political conditions (Rane & Salem, 2012). Despite this, the 
outcome of these collective protest actions varied greatly. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya underwent 
full-scale revolutions and former regimes were removed.  Yemen forced out its ruling president 
but kept its political structure. Uprisings in Morocco and Jordan forced liberal economic reform 
within the nations’ political structures. Conversely, Bahrain, Iraq and Algeria’s efforts failed to 
remove their ruling regime, and Syria continues to rally against its regime.  Finally, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates only experienced minor protests that failed to gain the widespread 
support of citizens (Johnstad, 2012).   
As a whole, these events comprise the Arab Spring.  However, when adopting a social 
movement approach to studying these events, there are vast differences between each state’s 
uprising and the change or lack thereof that resulted.  However, social movement scholars 
attempting to account for these differences lack consensus in their focus and approach.  In their 
influential article McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) categorize social movements, revolutions 
and social protests under the inclusive label of contentious politics. However, this catch-all 
approach has not allowed for the careful study of how revolutions form and develop.  Piven and 
Cloward (1991) present a compelling argument when they note that there is clearly a problem 
when the participants and authorities recognize the difference between a riot and an election 
rally, but the literature does not. Jack Goldstone (1998) furthers that the popular demarcation 
drawn between social movements and revolutions is whether or not the collective action seeks to 
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overthrow the state.  However, this seemingly clear demarcation falls apart when applied to 
historical revolutions that initially sought less radical change. Morris (2000) notes in his survey 
of social science theories about social movements that there is a lack of focus on human agency 
within these collective actions. As a result, the field lacks the ability to develop a nuanced 
understanding of the different forms of collective action.   
This lack of understanding may be related to the objects of study for political scientists 
and sociologists.  While both disciplines make use of communication as a means of 
understanding collective behavior, neither focuses specifically on the way that rhetoric employed 
by participants of collect actions and societal institutions functions to challenge or reinforce the 
status quo. Therefore, political scientists and sociologists are more focused on the context, 
history and actors involved in collective actions rather than the communication that brings these 
social phenomena into existence.  It follows then, that communication scholars, particularly 
those who study social movement rhetoric, would be the ones to answer Morris’ (2000) call to 
investigate the role of human agency in collective action.  
Rhetorical movement scholars are skilled in analyzing the unique ways that rhetoric 
brings people together to mobilize for change as reflected by a healthy body of literature.  Thus, 
rhetorical scholars are uniquely prepared to offer insight into this area of social movement 
studies. Charles Stewart (1980) notes that rhetoric is the primary form of agency for movements, 
and rhetorically examining its functions reveals a movement’s purpose. Thus, rhetorical social 
movement scholars are poised to answer the call of Morris (2000) for studying human agency 
within movements and more specifically revolutionary movements like the Arab Spring. To do 
so requires a refinement of the available rhetorical approaches to studying social movements.   
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Rhetorical scholars also approach social movements through broad definitions. Modern 
social movement rhetoricians tend to treat “social movement” as an umbrella term for collective 
action as perceived by a critic (Sillars, 1980).  However, unlike political scientists and 
sociologists, rhetorical movement scholars lack a developed base of literature focused 
specifically on revolutionary movements.  That is to say that while several scholars have focused 
on social “revolutions” within civil rights, science, religion and linguistics (Jensen & 
Hammerback, 1982; Pauley, 1998; and Stewart, 1997) few have applied a rhetorical movement 
lens to examine revolutionary movements. Therefore, this research intends to answer Morris’ 
(2000) call for future research by refining broad rhetorical social movement approaches into a 
revolution-specific lens that borrows from relevant interdisciplinary revolution literature. 
The exploration of revolutions as a collective communicative action is an area ripe for the 
renewed interest of social movement scholars.  The unpacking of revolutionary rhetoric has the 
potential to reveal as much about those who participate in revolutions as the societies in which 
revolutions occurs. Additionally, rhetorical scholars can contribute to the academic and policy 
conversations about revolutions currently informed by political scientists and sociologists. 
Simons (1976) notes, social science can refine and challenge rhetorical theories about social 
movements. Thus, rhetorical scholars entering the study of revolutions can help expand our 
collective knowledge about a phenomenon that has social, economic, political and human costs.  
But perhaps more importantly, rhetorical scholars have the ability to demystify the language used 
to maintain and challenge the status quo.  In the case of the Arab Spring, this status quo was tied 
to regimes with long histories of human rights abuse, economic inequality and fraudulent 
government actions (Johnstad, 2012). Thus, rhetorical insight into revolutions can promote the 
ethical use of rhetoric to reform, challenge and overthrow governments.  
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A closer examination of the current state of the field as well as the emergence of new 
revolutionary texts, reveals that rhetorical social movement scholars already possess the tools 
necessary to breathe new life into this important area of study. The remainder of this chapter 
discusses the current definitional state of social movements, the availability of revolutionary 
rhetoric and methodological tools, and the potential benefits of carving out a space for the 
rhetorical movement study of revolutions. The chapter concludes with an outline course of study. 
Initially, it is critical to recognize that revolutions fall within the existing scope of 
rhetorical social movement studies. Many scholars have proposed definitions of what constitutes 
a social movement (Cathcart, 1972, 1980; Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; Griffin, 1952; Lucas, 1980; 
McGee, 1980; Riches & Sillars, 1980).  A brief sampling of frequently cited definitions 
illustrates the diversity of these proposed definitions. Leland Griffin (1952, p. 84) defined social 
movement as a past event in which “(1) men have become dissatisfied with some aspect of their 
environment (2) they desire change – social, economic, political, religious, intellectual or 
otherwise – and desiring change, they make efforts to alter their environment (3) eventually, their 
efforts result in some degree of success or failure; the desired change is or is not effected and we 
may say that the historical movement has come to its termination.”  This definition refers 
exclusively to historical social movements. Robert Cathcart (1983, p. 234) provided a narrow 
rhetorical definition in which social movements are essentially rhetorical transactions of a special 
type, distinguishable by the peculiar reciprocal rhetorical acts set off between the movement on 
the one hand and the established system or controlling agency on the other.” Michael McGee 
(1980) argues that social movements are a set of meanings that can be studied through 
ideographs. In this sense, social movements refer only to patterns of language characteristics 
(McGee, 1980).  A scholar should look for way in which these patterns change as evidence of a 
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social movement (McGee, 1980). As the publication dates suggest, this conversation has died 
down in the last thirty years. Hahn & Gonchar (1980) and Zarefsky (1980) defend this move 
away from developing theory arguing that the development of an exclusively rhetorical 
definition of social movement is a dead end.   
Without an agreed upon rhetorical theory of movement, the area of study moved forward 
through individually justified studies and methodologies. Riches and Sillars (1980) noted this 
trend when they reviewed 101 rhetorical social movement studies and found that 72 of the 
studies made no reference to rhetorical movement theory. Of the references that were recorded, 
only seven studies relied heavily on rhetorical social movement specific theory. They concluded 
that there was a clear divide between theory and the actual practice of rhetorical analysis of 
social movements (Riches & Sillars, 1980).  This separation ultimately led to the abandonment 
of theory specific to social movements and the rise of individualized studies.  Thus, rhetorical 
social movement scholars moved away from developing theory and instead focused on 
developing a body of study concerned with the unique characteristics each social movement. 
Modern social movement studies have ranged from the adapted Burkean analysis of the civil 
rights movement by Charles Griffin (2003) to an ethnographical approach to studying the 
rhetoric of coalition-building between a queer and immigration organization by Karma Chavez 
(2011).  Yet, studies of modern revolutions through a social movement lens are notably rare and 
often focus on the media used by the movement instead of the movement itself (Moussa, 2011, 
Rane & Selma, 2012). While James Wilkinson (1989) wrote about the rhetoric of revolution, he 
argues that the rhetoric of revolution in a traditional sense, like the French Revolution, has died 
off. Other rhetorical scholars, like Cathcart (1983) only mention social movements that have 
brought about revolutionary change but stop short of labeling the movement a revolution.  The 
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range of “movements” addressed by modern critics may be concerning to those that agree with 
Cathcart’s (1983) call for a narrow definition as not all of the studies focus on the rhetoric of 
confrontation and the dialectic entanglement required to meet his definition. However, others 
like Sillars have reconciled with this breadth by accepting a broad definition of movements. 
Sillars (1980, p. 30) argued movements are simply “collective actions that are perceived by a 
critic. They are defined by that critic in terms of the most useful rhetorical events, conflicts or 
strategies that will best explain the critic’s view of the movement.”  Under this definition of 
social movements, the critic is responsible for justifying her or his selection of the movement and 
the lens of analysis.  Thus, critics must perform their analyses with careful rigor when selecting 
the scope, method, standard and evidence of their study (Sillars, 1980).  The continued 
development of rhetorical social movement studies suggests this approach has value.  
Nevertheless, this ever-growing body of literature still lacks in the area of theoretical 
development.  
Specifically, when critics are tasked with justifying their analysis and methodology, 
developing and refining theory becomes unappealing. Riches and Sillars (1980) discovered the 
theoretical underpinnings of the majority of studied works were based in rhetorical theory and 
not specifically rhetorical social movement theory. A provided explanation noted that the 
established nature of the theory likely made it more appealing to scholars (Riches & Sillars, 
1980).  While this appeal is understandable and may guard against sloppy analysis, it also ties the 
development of social movement studies to the development of rhetorical theory.  This is 
problematic as these theories require tailoring to be applied to social movements. Furthermore, it 
cuts off rhetorical scholars from developing alongside interdisciplinary movement studies.   
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While the theoretical debate about rhetorical definitions of movements died down around 
1980 for rhetorical scholars, other disciplines began to rapidly develop and refine their own 
social movement theories. John Downing (2008, p. 40) identifies several areas of theoretical 
development including resource mobilization/rational actor, “New Social Movement”, 
contentious politics, solidarity social movements, social networks and transnational social 
movements. The discussion has become so expansive that academic journals like Social 
Movement Studies and Mobilization focus specifically on this developing body of literature 
(Downing, 2008).  Further exploration of these specific areas of study is not necessary for this 
study.  However, the boom of theoretical discussions among social scientists highlights the lack 
of development of rhetorical theory in studying social movements. 
This may explain why revolutions have not been taken on in earnest by social movement 
scholars. The study of revolutions not only requires the tailoring of rhetorical theory, but also 
interdisciplinary theories that provide specific insight to revolutions. Furthermore, the burden of 
justifying methodology discourages the development of genres and sub-categorization because it 
requires the critic to return to the messy affair of definition.  The value and need for such 
distinctions has been discussed extensively by scholars who viewed categorization as a means of 
continuing research while simultaneously investigating the theoretical nature of movements 
(Cathcart, 1983; Lucas, 1980; Riches & Sillars, 1980; and Smith, 1976). Of the scholars who 
were willing to set aside the definitional debate, many advocated for the   development of sub-
categories (Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; Lucas, 1980; and Riches & Sillars, 1980). More than thirty 
years later the field of rhetorical movement study still lacks developed sub-bodies of research 
and frequent studies that answer calls for future research. While this research does not intend to 
engage in the definitional dispute of rhetorical movement studies, it does intend to propose a 
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methodology for studying revolutionary movements in hopes of encouraging the development of 
a sub-body of research. 
With an understanding of the current state of social movements, a discussion of the 
availability of methodological tools and revolutionary rhetorical texts follows. First, it is worth 
exploring the relationship between social scientists and rhetoricians. As scholars, each has the 
methods necessary to account for the complex revolutionary environments that include political, 
social and cultural factors. Lucas (1980, p. 262) explained, “Social movements are complex 
phenomena that invite interrogation from a number of perspectives.”  Further, because 
sociological and rhetorical perspectives are complimentary as both are interested in how a set of 
beliefs identifying what is wrong and what needs to be changed energizes a social movement 
(Lucas, 1980).  It is not uncommon for our field to borrow theories from political science or 
sociology.  However, this benefit is mutual. Cathcart (1980) noted rhetoricians’ ability to provide 
unique insight to expand our understanding of confrontation within society.  In addition, Simons 
(1976), though blunt regarding his distaste for purely empirical examinations of movements, did 
praise social scientists’ ability to test movement theories with reliable results. 
In regards to revolutions, rhetoricians can provide extremely valuable insight. The rapid 
and volatile nature of revolutions is not conducive to traditional social science research. Those 
participating in revolutions may alter their accounts of their own participation during post-
interviews regardless of the uprising’s outcome (Borch, 2006).  This lack of empirical data 
complicates the study of revolutions through a quantitative approach (Johnstad, 2012).  
However, the advent of social media allows for real-time collection of data that is ripe for 
rhetorical analysis.  These communication artifacts provide an unfiltered collage of rhetoric that 
can be analyzed to gain a broader understanding of the revolution as a whole.  Thus, it is 
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imperative that rhetoricians engage in studying revolutions because of their potential to offer 
unique and valuable insight. 
In political science, the distinction between revolutions and other social movements is 
often focused on intent or the goals of the collective action. An oversimplified definition simply 
asks whether or not the collective action seeks to overthrow the state. Goldstone’s (1998) rejects 
this definition suggesting that the distinction can be better illuminated by examining the framing 
of grievances, identification and mobilization of supporters, the available collective action and 
the relation of the group to other supporting and resisting groups.  Such areas of focused interest 
are not unfamiliar to movement scholars.  Specifically, Griffin’s (1969) dramatistic theory and 
Stewart’s (1980) functional approach to rhetorically studying movements both discuss 
grievances, identification, mobilization and a movement’s relationship with an opposing group.   
Furthermore, Goldstone (1998) advances an argument that while revolutions may be impossible 
to distinguish from other social movements in their developmental stages, it is the reaction of the 
government that alters the collective action’s development. Specifically, how a government 
limits the choices of a movement and how the movement reacts may be the first indication of a 
revolutionary movement. Such concerns align with Griffin’s (1969) and Cathcart’s (1980) 
discussion of the dialect entanglement necessary for a social movement to progress into public 
consciousness.  Additionally, Goldstone’s work relates to Cathcart’s (1983) call for further 
investigation as to how a counter-movement, or the government in this case, impacts the 
movement. Goldstone (1998) suggests that there is a certain type of entanglement between the 
two parties that is necessary and unique to revolutions.  Thus, Goldstone’s theoretical foundation 
for distinguishing revolutions is well suited for a rhetorical adaptation.   
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Approaches like Goldstone’s can be adapted to better inform the public in a timelier 
manner about revolutions by utilizing rhetorical analysis for real-time rhetorical artifacts.  As 
mentioned previously, the collection of empirical data about revolutions is problematic 
(Johnstad, 2012).  This difficulty is further compounded when revolutions take place in states 
that are capable of restricting journalist and scholarly access.  The Internet, specifically social 
media, have provided an alternative view of these political, social and communication 
phenomena.  Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) note that the Arab Spring coverage by government-run 
media, like Egypt’s, was vastly different from the coverage provided by social media. The 
frames provided by media sources influence individual and societal understandings of collective 
action (Hamdy & Gomaa).  Unlike government-run and independent media outlets, social media 
users are free from corporate economic and political pressure that may cause revolution coverage 
to be sympathetic to the established order. Social media content, which has often been able to 
route around the restrictive attempts of protested governments, provides rhetorical scholars a 
venue to study revolutions as they are occurring.  This gives rhetorical scholars a distinct 
advantage over scholars that must wait to collect data by empirical standards.    
As previously discussed, the complexity of social movements calls for investigation by 
multiple disciplines (Lucas, 1980). Furthermore, the development of a sub-body of rhetorical 
social movement studies focus on revolutions meets the calls of rhetoricians willing to put aside 
old definitional debates.  One way this call can be answered is through the translation of 
interdisciplinary theory into an approach that identifies the unique rhetorical aspects of a 
revolution. The consideration and adaptation of Goldstone’s (1998) conception of revolutions 
along with the rhetorical approaches of Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) provides a basis for 
such a methodological approach.  This thesis adapts these insights and applies the resulting 
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rhetorical lens to the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution.  Thus, this research aims to lay 
foundational scholarship for the future development and refinement of rhetorical social 
movement analysis focused specifically on revolutions. 
Egypt’s public unrest in early 2011 provides movement scholars a unique opportunity as 
social media sites preserved the unfiltered rhetoric used by protestors on Twitter, Facebook and 
YouTube. Within Egypt, Twitter and Facebook played a significant role in the Arab Spring 
Revolution (Rane & Salem, 2012).  Additionally, the Egyptian Revolution was pre-empted and 
followed by widespread collective action that fits within traditional definitions of social 
movements. With the existence of what may be identified as a revolution occurring in between 
social movements, Egypt offers a case study that begs for a clearer definition of a revolution 
within the context of rhetorical movement studies.    
This thesis asks two overarching questions. What are the rhetorical characteristics of 
revolutions? Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements? 
The body of social movement literature largely informs this research. Specifically, 
Griffin’s (1969) conception of the rhetorical stages of social movement development paired with 
Stewart’s (1980) functional rhetorical approach to movements serves as a basis for translating 
interdiscplinary research into rhetorical terms. Interdisciplinary scholarship is also foundational 
to this research.  Goldstone (1998) offers a clear theoretical conception of how revolutions 
develop out of social movements. Finally, the work of communication scholars investigating 
social media’s role in the Arab Spring provides support for the analysis of Facebook and Twitter 
posts as rhetorical texts of Egypt’s revolution.   
As mentioned previously, it is not the intent of this research to engage in old battles of 
definition.  Instead, this thesis hopes that the translation of interdisciplinary research paired with 
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widely accepted rhetorical methodology will produce a reliable framework for analyzing 
revolutions rhetorically.  The development of such a framework will help provide informed 
insight into the unique phenomena of revolutions. This examination consists of five chapters.  
Chapter one will provide a rationale and justification for the investigation of revolutions as 
rhetorically distinct and result in two research questions. Chapter two will review the current 
available literature involving selected rhetorical approaches to studying social movements, 
interdisciplinary approaches to studying revolutions and social media’s role in the Arab Spring. 
Chapter three will set forward a rhetorical methodology for identifying and analyzing 
revolutionary movements. Chapter four applies this methodology to the Arab Spring revolution 
in Egypt.  Finally, chapter five will discuss implications, conclusions and areas of future research 
generated by this study. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 This chapter covers the relevant literature necessary to adapt rhetorical movement 
scholars’ current methods into a more tailored approach focused on analyzing revolutions.  This 
thesis’ model results from the tailoring of three theoretical models, two rhetorical models and 
one interdisciplinary. The models have been selected based on their broad scope as all three 
models focus on the entire lifespan of a movement.  
Leland Griffin (1969) dramatistic model addresses the rhetorical periods of a movement 
that can be identified by dramatistic forms of rhetoric. Charles Stewart (1980) also seeks to 
understand the lifespan of a movement but does so through examining rhetorical functions. A 
more detailed discussion follows, but for now it is important to note that these rhetorical models 
are not linear in nature and do not seek to produce a timeline study of movements. Griffin (1969) 
argues that a movement can cycle between rhetorical periods while Stewart’s (1980) asserts that 
a movement can meet different rhetorical functions at the same time. Both Griffin (1969) and 
Stewart (1980) are concerned with analyzing a movement’s rhetoric as a product of rational 
human agency as a means of gaining insight into the movement’s purpose and progression. This 
focus pairs well with Jack Goldstone’s (1998) staged model that outlines the development of 
social movements into revolutions. His model seeks to understand how a ruling regime’s reaction 
to a social movement impacts its development into a revolution.  Essentially, Goldstone (1998) 
takes a political science approach to understand the same dynamic relationship between a social 
movement and the ruling regime (counter-movement) that Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) 
address.  These three models serve as the foundation for this chapter.   
While Griffin (1969), Stewart (1980) and Goldstone’s (1998) models are foundational to 
this chapter, other relevant literature is necessary to produce a tailor rhetorical approach for 
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studying revolutions. The chapter is organized by academic discipline. Specifically, rhetorical 
approaches to social movements including Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) are discussed. 
Next, Goldstone’s (1998) model and interdisciplinary approaches to analyzing social movements 
are addressed before a summary of the available literature regarding social media as rhetorical 
text during revolutions. 
 Section One: Rhetorical Approaches 
 The rhetorical study of social movements has been heavily influenced by the dramatistic 
model as developed by Griffin (1969). Stewart’s (1980) functional approach has also gained 
traction among rhetorical movement scholars. Both approaches seek to understand themes of 
human agency through social movement rhetoric. These works provide a solid rhetorical 
foundation for the development of a revolutionary-specific model as both seek to examine the 
lifespan of a movement’s rhetoric. After understanding Griffin’s (1969) dramatistic and 
Stewart’s (1980) functional approaches, the chapter touches on Wilkinson’s (1989) brief 
discussion of French Revolution rhetoric. This summary of the rhetorical literature serves as 
foundation for an adapted rhetorical methodology that seeks to distinguish and study 
revolutionary movements.   
Griffin asserts that all movements are inherently political as all are concerned with 
“governance or dominion.”  Marginalized individuals who seek to disrupt the status quo of 
society by confronting those in power create, develop and maintained movements.  This conflict 
is necessary for drama and as Griffin quotes Kenneth Burke (1957) “politics above all is drama” 
(p. 267). Thus, he justifies his application of a Burkean dramatistic approach to study 
movements. This approach assumes that dramatic scenes are rhetorically created by rational 
choices employed by an orator.  To study movements is to study human agency through the 
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rhetoric that performs the functions of a movement and identifies its purpose. Studying 
movements in this way is to study the forms of movement action which contain meaning and 
motive. These identifiable dramatistic forms of rhetorical movement can be broken down into 
identifiable periods. The progression of a movement may not reach every period. It may also 
return to previous periods. Griffin (1952) originally identified three period of movement progress 
including inception, crisis and consummation. He later adapted his theory to align with Burke’s 
drama of social relation and included the additional periods of eloquence and stasis (Griffin, 
1969). 
The inception period is a time where the sentiments of marginalized individuals or a 
single rhetor are expressed. This period may benefit from a physical catalyst, like a shocking 
event, but the movement may also enter this period through more gradual means. Griffin (1969) 
describes this period as one where public tensions are innovated. It is a time of identifying the 
“good” and “evil” within society. During this time. marginalized individuals come together 
seeking solidarity and a re-envisioned status quo.  The movement’s expression of understanding 
or a conviction of what must be resisted unites individuals. This period’s characteristics include  
dual rhetorical strategies that first seek to encourage doubt and misunderstanding among 
individuals and second seek to generate conflict with a representative entity of the status quo. A 
movement must generate conflict with the existing order through the rise of a counter-movement. 
Once a counter-movement announces itself, the movement can gain public notice and enter into 
the crisis period.  
Griffin (1969) describes the crisis period as one of transformation and creation. During 
the crisis period, the movement calls for the allegiance of its members in their opposition to the 
old system of authority.  With the rise of the countermovement there is a sense of urgency to 
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seek salvation through the conversion of others and direct action. In Griffin’s words it is “a time 
of mass decision; catharsis, purgation, the resolution of public tensions” (p. 466).  The movement 
rhetorically kills the old authority system, and a new system must emerge.   
The period of consummation follows once the movement has replaced the old system of 
authority. New reason, justice and identity that stems from the values of the movement indicate 
the emergence of a new system.  Individuals no longer argue over meaning, values or desire. 
Instead, they share attitudes of benevolence. The classes of the new hierarchy exist 
harmoniously, and there is a widespread acceptance that the new order is “good”.  Griffin (1969) 
calls this a time of redemption marked by the loving rhetoric of courtship.  The rhetoric of 
assent, affirmation and allegiance to the movement also marks the comsummation period. Thus, 
the leaders of the new authority system seek to actualize the vision of the movement. 
When utopia cannot be achieved, the consummation period’s rhetoric of courtship 
morphs into the rhetoric of persuasion during the period of eloquence. Griffin (1969) describes 
this period as one marked by praise, respect, edification and transcendence of the movement. He 
goes on to state that this period can “be expected at the farthest reach of the movement, to 
transcend itself by passing, beyond language, into the region of Silence” (Griffin, 1969 p. 471). 
Once this occurs, the final period of stasis emerges.  The movement has become the status quo 
and may be challenged by other social movements.  
Griffin (1969) laid the foundation for much of the early work in rhetorical social 
movement studies. Years later, Stewart (1980) sought to respond to Griffin’s (1952) call for 
future research investigating the existence of rhetorical patterns and forms. He expresses 
frustration with the microscope, or specific case study, approach to examining social movements 
as it does little to identify the rhetorical patterns Griffin (1952, 1969) sought to identify. As an 
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alternative, Stewart draws from the previous works of rhetoricians, like McGee (1975), who 
called for rhetoricians to focus on the outward functions of movement rhetoric.  This broad 
functional approach allows for the systematic study of the vast array of social movements that is 
capable of answering Griffin’s (1952) call for future research (Stewart, 1980). In an attempt to 
develop a macroscopic agency-focused method, he identifies the rhetorical functions a 
movement. He asserts that rhetoric is the primary form of agency for movements; movements 
and institutionalized collectives may function similarly but are constrained differently; and the 
extent to which a function is performed is reflective of a movement’s purpose (Stewart, 1980). 
These functions are not progressive stages, and some functions may dominate the rhetoric of the 
movement. The approach identifies five rhetorical functions of a movement; transforming 
perceptions of history, transforming perceptions of society, prescribing courses of action, 
mobilizing for action and sustaining the social movement. Stewart along with Craig Smith and 
Robert Denton, Jr. (2012) expanded this model in their book titled: Persuasion and Social 
Movements.  
First, the movement must alter the perception of history, including the past, present and 
future, to convince followers than an intolerable situation exists and must be addressed.  As a 
movement continues and succeeds, it may need to adapt formerly promoted perceptions.  This 
function includes rhetoric that calls to attention an intolerable condition(s) that must be 
addressed. Stewart (1980) alludes that this is an initial stage that relates to Griffin’s (1969) 
inception period.  
The second function, calls for the alteration of societal perceptions of the movement’s 
opposition. Stewart (1980) explains that the rhetoric must strip the opposition of their legitimacy. 
Within this function, the movement must also provide a new identity for its target audience in 
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order to create the conflict between “we” and “they.” The target audience is described in terms of 
moral goodness while the opposition comes to represent oppression and evil.  This function must 
also alter the self-perceptions of the target audience so that they believe in their self-worth and 
ability to cast off the oppressive opposition. Often this is done by rejecting old labels attached to 
group among the target audience and replacing them with labels that instill pride in the followers.   
In order to resist the “evil” opposition, the movement must, third, prescribe a course of 
action to address the problem. Here the movement’s demands and prescribed course of action are 
outlined. The rhetoric must answer questions of who should enact the solution and how it should 
be implemented.  Additionally, Stewart (1980) identifies the potential for intra- and inter-
movement conflict if multiple demands and solutions are proposed either by other movements or 
within different factions of the same movement. Thus, movements must be prepared to defend 
their actions from criticism and potential backlash. 
Mobilizing for action is the fourth function. Stewart (1980) explains that movement’s 
rhetoric must function to mobilize its target audience to carry out a variety of actions.  During 
this stage, groups of followers are both united and organized to carry out the movement’s course 
of action.  The spectrum of this action is immense and includes action focused on self-change, 
gaining control of societal influence and garnering attention for the movement. Stewart (1980) 
explains that the central purpose of this function is to convince followers that victory is viable 
and foreseeable in the near future.    
Finally, Stewart (1980) discusses how a movement must rhetorically function to sustain 
itself. This stems from Stewart’s assumption that social movements usually last for years. 
Regardless of how long a movement exists, it must continually defend itself as necessary and 
address setbacks.  This period seeks to sustain the viability of the movement through continued 
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member conversation and the reinforcement of current members’ convictions.  Further, the 
movement must enact rhetoric to remain visible. 
Both Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) discuss movements in broad generalized terms.  
However, as previously mentioned in Chapter 1, rhetorical scholars have only explored 
revolutionary rhetoric in a very limited sense.  Wilkinson’s (1989) fleeting discussion of the 
rhetoric of the French Revolution highlights this observation.  While he outlines the main tenets 
of this type of rhetoric, Wilkinson (1989) is convinced that it is an outdated rhetoric that lost its 
appeal after being adapted by Marxist revolutionaries.  Nevertheless, his discussion of the 
rhetorical functions of revolutions is noticeably similar to Stewart’s (1980) concept of 
movements’ rhetorical functions.  Wilkinson (1989) argues that French Revolution rhetoric 
sought to perform three functions; appeal to moral generalities, create a binary world and 
demystify authority. 
The French Revolution highlights rhetoric that engages in the evocation of moral 
principles that serve as a justification for rejecting the State. This form of rhetorical justification 
relates to the concept of natural law (Wilkinson, 1989). Thus, supporters of the revolution come 
together and step outside the legal and social bonds maintained by the state in order to appeal to 
a higher authority.  Here Wilkinson approach differs from Griffin (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) 
approach.  In Griffin and Stewart’s conception of social movements, specific grievances and 
goals are expressed by the movement.  Griffin discusses this expression when referring to 
manifestos, proclamations and constitutions (p. 462). The expression of a specific course of 
action marks Stewart’s (1980) prescription function. However, Wilkinson notes that during the 
French Revolution rhetors sought to appeal more broadly to followers through moral generalities 
of “truth, justice, reason, and, of course, liberty” (p. 157).  
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Next Wilkinson (1989) discusses the creation of a binary world through rhetoric. This 
rhetoric seeks to create a simplified choice and eliminate the potential for individuals to remain 
indifferent. The movement is virtuous while the state represents vice.  The movement promises 
liberty whereas the state practices oppression.  Those who support the revolution are motivated 
by a pure patriotic spirit while the upholders of the state are only motivated by self-interest. The 
revolution fulfills this function by promising a new morally comprised society and denouncing 
those who stand in the way of change.  The rhetoric is not a general critique of society but 
instead it is an emotionally charged confrontation of selected targets (Wilkinson, 1989). The 
rhetorical vision contains moral absolutes that leave no room for doubt.  Essentially, the scene is 
in black and white.  Thus, the creation of a binary world also functions as a mobilizing strategy.  
This differs only slightly from Griffin (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) discussions.  All three 
scholars identify a period in which “the good” is identified and “the bad” is named.  
Finally, Wilkinson (1989) asserts that revolutionary rhetoric, as represented by the 
French Revolution, seeks to demystify authority.  He explains that this rhetoric seeks to put “at 
the top that which was on the bottom.” This rhetoric seeks to reverse societal values and promote 
the disrespect of the state.  This function is similar to Griffin’s (1969) discussion of rhetoric that 
seeks to highlight misunderstanding during the inception period.  But in Wilkinson’s (1989) view 
this rhetoric cannot be contained to one period or even the revolution itself.  He notes that once 
the rhetoric of authority is unmasked in a rhetorical scene of moral absolutes, the new system of 
power lacks the rhetorical resources to live up to its promise.  As a result in post-revolutionary 
states, power becomes synonymous with persuasion (Wilkinson, 1989).  This conclusion is 
related to Griffin’s (1969) discussion of stasis and also relates to Stewart’s (1980) assertion that 
the movements must continually perform maintenance. 
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 Wilkinson’s (1989) discussion of revolutionary rhetoric is extremely valuable to this 
research.  However, it is worth noting that Wilkinson did not view his description as one that 
could be applied to contemporary revolutions. He argues that the revolutionary rhetoric of the 
French Revolution lost its distinctive effectiveness as humanistic ends were separated from 
violent means. He attributes this loss of power to the rise and fall of Marxist revolutions that 
called to attention the mystifying function of revolutionary rhetoric.  Essentially, he argues that 
those who sought to demystify the rhetoric of the state found their own rhetoric demystified. The 
renewed appeal of revolutionary rhetoric during the Arab Spring does not invalidate Wilkinson’s 
argument but instead suggests that his observations were limited to the available data at the time 
of his writing.   
Stewart (1980) and Griffin (1969) offer two different but related approaches to examining 
social movements rhetorically. Wilkinson’s (1989) brief discussion supplements a rhetorical 
understanding of how a revolution theoretically progresses. Both Stewart (1980) and Griffin 
(1969) welcomed the possibility of future refinement and adaptation of their approaches as 
rhetorical scholars gained new knowledge about movements.  With this rhetorical foundation, 
literature relating to revolutions from the fields of political science and sociology can be 
examined.  
 Section Two: Interdisciplinary Approaches 
 The insights of political scientists and sociologists are particularly useful when tailoring a 
rhetorical methodology to specifically examine revolutionary movements. Sociologist Aldon 
Morris’ (2000) in his article “Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals” bemoans 
social movement theories’ lack of attention regarding human agency’s impact on the goals and 
strategies of movements. He argues these tactical decisions are made by leaders and thus 
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understanding human agency is critical to the study of social movements (Morris, 2000). As 
previously discussed, rhetoricians examine rhetoric as means of addressing concepts of human 
agency through discussions of constraints and empowerment. Therefore, rhetorical scholars and 
social scientists have a shared interest in investigating social movement, including revolutions.    
On the surface, social scientists studying collective action seem to make a clear 
distinction between social movement and revolution. Goldstone (1998) notes that many who 
study collective action focus on the goals of the action to define it. Thus, if a collective action 
seeks to overthrow the state, then it is ipso facto a revolution (Goldstone, 1998). This method of 
distinction has been taken up by scholars who have sought to house revolutions, collective 
protests and social movements under the broad term of “contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow 
& Tilly, 1996). Goldstone applauds this inclusive approach but notes that defining a collective 
action by its expressed goals ignores the progressive and adaptive nature of social movements 
and revolutions.  Goldstone asserts that the progression of a movement is influenced by the 
conflict it generates and the resulting conditions that demand adaptation. It is Goldstone’s focus 
on conflict and adaptation that aligns his model with Griffin’s (1969) and Stewart’s (1980).  
Goldstone’s interest in identifying the distinct qualities of revolutions makes his model a good fit 
to adapt into rhetorical terms.  
In his “Divergent Phenomena View of Social Movement and Revolutions” model 
Goldstone (1998, p. 129) argues that a repressive state response is the catalyst necessary to move 
a social movement toward a revolutionary identity. The initial stages of a social movement and 
revolution are impossible to distinguish, as the conditions that bring them about are shared 
(Goldstone, 1998).  Here the model addresses the movement processes of grievance definition, 
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issue framing, member identification and strategy selection. This focus shares much with the 
previous discussion of rhetorical approaches to studying movements.  
The inability to distinguish carries over into the period of social mobilization for a 
change. As first expressed, the desired change and goals of a social movement and a revolution 
may hold no distinction.  Goldstone (1998) notes that the goals of the French Revolution were 
first expressed by the Estates General that “sought to reshape the conditions of social status, 
financial exemption and military and administrative service, as well as the royal tax system.” (p. 
127). These goals do not meet the narrow definition that paints a revolution as collective action 
that seeks to overthrow the state.  However, Goldstone (1998) argues that it is not the goals of 
the movement that result in a revolution but instead the state’s response to the expressed goals.  
Much like Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) identify conflict as a necessary condition for social 
movement, Goldstone (1998) argues that an initially weak or erratic state repressive response is 
needed to generate a revolution.   
The model identifies three levels of repressive response; mild, weak/erratic and strong.  
Each response forces the movement to adapt and produce its own response.  A mild state 
response aligns with the rhetorical discussion of a counter-movement/opposition.  This conflict is 
necessary and beneficial for the movement to enter into public consciousness. Goldstone (1998) 
notes the mild state response legitimizes the movement and provides the conflict necessary for 
change. On the converse, if a social movement meets a strong repressive response by the state, 
the movement will be crushed entirely or driven underground and become ineffective. Goldstone 
points to examples of repressive regimes with the capacity to snuff out dissent.  Revolutions then 
are the response to weak or erratic responses by the state that effectively raise the stakes of the 
conflict without eliminating the movement. 
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This relationship between a repressive state response and the development of a revolution 
is well supported by throughout various disciplines studying movement. Sabine Karstedt-Henke 
(1980) explains that when a state attempts to repress a movement but does so ineffectively, it 
provides momentum. The galvanized movement is now more likely to strike back against the 
state through extreme means.  When referencing Griffin’s period of crisis, a survivable but 
repressive response from the state confirms the “we/the good” versus “they/the evil” dialect in 
material terms.  Finally McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (1996) suggest that nondemocratic regimes 
are more likely to experience rare but revolutionary mobilization whereas democratic regimes 
experience more frequent social movement mobilizations. 
This examination of interdisciplinary movement literature provides guidance for the 
adaptation of rhetorical social movement methods to study revolutions. Social scientists benefit 
from a body of literature that is more robust in regards to revolutions than rhetorical movement 
scholars.  However, that is not to say that other scholars are better equipped than rhetoricians to 
study such a phenomena. As previously discussed, social scientists struggle to gain truly 
representative accounts of revolutions from post-interviews as participants alter their accounts 
after the revolution (Borch, 2006).  This lack of empirical data complicates the study of 
revolutions through a quantitative approach (Johnstad, 2012).  This presents an excellent 
opportunity for rhetorical scholars to provide insight regarding revolutions.  Thus, adapting a 
rhetorical method to study revolutions generates original scholarship and provides 
interdisciplinary insight regarding revolutions. 
 Section Three: Social Media as Rhetorical Text 
The rise of social media and its use during the Arab Spring has garnered significant 
attention from communication scholars. At the time of writing, none of these studies directly 
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addressed the research question at hand. Nevertheless, their findings provide justification for the 
selection of social media as reliable rhetorical text when examining revolutions. Rane and Smith 
(2012) argue that studying social movements involved in the Arab Spring and their use of social 
media is essential for answering contemporary questions being asked in the field. While much of 
the literature in this section is specifically focused on the diffusion of ideas via social media 
during the Arab Spring, the authors’ discussions suggests that social media function as direct 
vehicles for revolutionary movement rhetoric.  More specifically, where other scholars are 
concerned with identifying reliable ways to gather empirical data, rhetorical scholars must be 
similarly concerned with the quality of their analyzed texts.  A review of the literature regarding 
the role of social media during the Arab Spring supports the selection of these texts as 
rhetorically representative.  As a rhetorical text, social media facilitates communication, exists 
outside of state-controlled channels, supports the identification function of movements and 
allows for recognition of major influencers. 
Initially, it is important to view social media as a facilitator of revolutions and not the 
cause of said collective action. Halverson, Ruston and Trethewey (2013) note that while the 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt are often referred as “Twitter Revolutions” the role of social 
media is more nuanced. Rane and Smith (2012) concluded that the role of social media in the 
Arab Spring was the “facilitation of communication and the transfer of information” (p. 103).  
Social media helped mobilize individuals and enabled supporters to function as citizen 
journalists covering the movement (Rane & Salem, 2012).   
As social media enables the spread of information outside the state-control channels, its 
use by supporters in inherently subversive. Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2005) argue that social 
media alters the playing field of collective actions and in doing so opens up “new vulnerabilities 
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for even the most established authoritarian regimes” (p. 365). Social media also facilitates the 
coming together of alienated or marginalized individuals as described by Griffin (1969) in his 
discussion of the inception period of movements.  In Egypt, the advent of social media, 
specifically Facebook in Arabic, connected political bloggers to a much larger public audience in 
which their criticism gained traction (Rane & Salem, 2012).  
In addition to serving subversive purposes, social media also facilitates the identification 
period discussed by Griffin (1969), Stewart (1980) and Wilkinson (1989).  Revolutions require 
strong social ties for individuals to take on the risk of opposing the state (Halverson, et al. 2013). 
Not only do social media connect like-minded individuals, but social media also invite the 
expression of commitment.  This expression is significant when considering the principles of 
consistency and commitment.  Ciadini (2001) explains that even small verbalization of 
allegiance generates pressure internally and externally to behave in line with that commitment.  
Based on a survey design in Egypt, Tufecki and Wilson (2012) found “controlling for other 
factors, social media use greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests on the 
first day.”  Thus, the expression is a rhetorical act of identifying and committing to the goals of 
the movement. 
Finally, social media help identify the major influencers or leaders of the movement.  
Twitter, a social media network, played a significant role in the flow of information during the 
Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution (Lotan et al., 2011).  While social media allow for followers to 
participate more directly in the construction of a movement’s public narrative (Halverson et al., 
2013), Twitter allows for the identification of key influencers.  Kwak et al. (2010) explain that 
the non-reciprocal nature of information sharing on Twitter results in it functioning more as an 
information-sharing network than a social network. Thus, well-positioned influencers can shape 
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how information flows (Lotan et al., 2011).  For example, a well-known leader’s tweet is more 
likely to be shared across social networks and at an increased frequency than a tweet from a 
lower level follower who lacks notoriety.  Thus, the unfiltered and preserved nature of social 
media texts makes them ideal for rhetorical analysis.  
The literature in this chapter provides a foundation for the tailoring of a rhetorical 
approach to studying revolutionary movements.  Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) provide the 
rhetorical framework necessary to identify the rhetorical periods and features of a social 
movement. Both address the required elements needed for a movement to progress towards its 
intended change. Wilkinson’s (1989) brief description of revolution rhetoric indicates that 
revolutions share rhetorical functions with social movements.  However, to better understand 
both the shared and unique rhetorical features of revolutions requires interdisciplinary insight. 
Goldstone (1998) meets this need with his model that distinguishes between social movements 
and revolutions.  Specifically, Goldstone (1998) argues that the context in which social 
movements occur is critical to the development of a revolution. The tailoring of Griffin (1969), 
Stewarts (1980) and Goldstone’s (1998) models requires a reliable rhetorical text in order to be 
applied.  The literature based regarding the use of social media during the Arab Spring supports 
the use of social media as a primary rhetorical text for studying revolutions  
The remaining chapters of this thesis tailored and apply a rhetorical movement approach 
to studying revolutionary based on Griffin (1969), Stewarts (1980) and Goldstone’s (1998) 
models.  In addition to outlining this new approach, the selection of Twitter and Facebook post 
during Egypt’s 2011 Arab Spring revolution is defended in chapter three.  Chapter four applies 
this tailored methodology to the Egyptian Revolution through a rhetorical analysis.  Finally, 
implications, limitation and future areas of study are discussed.     
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Chapter 3 - Methodological Framework 
 This chapter seeks to provide an applicable model to analyze the rhetorical development 
of revolutions and answer this thesis’ research questions. Additionally, the success of this model 
would allow for future investigation of revolutions by rhetorical movement scholars.  This model 
seeks to answer the following research questions: What are the rhetorical characteristics of 
revolutions? Are revolutions rhetorically distinct from social movements? This chapter will 
utilize the Goldstone (1998) model that charts the distinction between social movements and 
revolutions.  Specifically, this chapter is concerned with Goldstone’s (1998) stages of revolution 
development and realization.  Griffin’s (1969) approach is laid over top of Goldstone’s (1998) 
model.  The rhetorical periods of inception, crisis and eloquence are most prevalent when apply 
Griffin’s (1969) model to Goldstone’s (1998).  More specifically, the abrupt conclusion to 
revolutions, which will be discussed later, results in a revolution being unable to enter into 
Griffin’s later stages of consummation, eloquence and stasis.  Although brief, Wilkinson’s 
(1989) discussion of rhetorical functions of revolutions is included. Stewart’s (1980) rhetorical 
function approach is also incorporated to translate Goldstone’s (1998) model into rhetorical 
terms.  Stewart (1980) sought to outline general rhetorical functions of social movements.  
However in this methodology a distinction is made between general social movement rhetorical 
functions and revolutionary rhetorical functions. This chapter will conclude by providing a 
rationale for the selection of a subset of tweets from the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring.  
 Before discussing the stages of this tailored model, a discussion of its assumptions is 
necessary.  First, Goldstone’s (1998) model assumes that collective action cannot cycle between 
stages. Goldstone (1998) argues that a revolution cannot return to its previous social movement 
stages once a state attempts to repress it. This is in conflict with Griffin (1969) who allows for 
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movements to return to previous stages. This methodology sides with Goldstone’s model and 
hypothesizes that the radical nature of revolutionary rhetoric does not allow for the movement to 
return to prior stages and instead demands forward movement.  This demand for forward 
movement does not conflict with Stewart’s’ (1980) assertion that movements can meet various 
rhetorical functions at the same time.  Instead, this thesis’ model is divided into stages where 
certain rhetorical functions are expected to emerge. As a result, this model is sequential in nature. 
 Second, the following proposed model is an exclusively rhetorical method. This model 
assumes that the motivation of a revolution will become known through the movement’s 
rhetoric.  This assumption is consistent with Griffin’s (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) discussions of 
the nature of social movement rhetoric. This thesis’ model assumes Goldstone’s (1998) argument 
that the causes of social movements and revolutions cannot be distinguished.  Goldstone 
discusses these causes as material while this tailored model treats the causes as rhetorical 
inventions.  
Based on these assumptions this model is separated into six stages.  These stages include: 
1) The identification of grievances, 2) the initial mobilization for action, 3) the state response, 4) 
the radicalized adaptation of purpose 5) the subsequent mobilization for revolt, 6) and the 
conclusion.  As previously mentioned, these stages are entered into sequentially.  Scholars 
applying this model should look for the emerging rhetoric as some rhetorical functions will 
permeate into later stages of the revolution after initially being deployed. The careful application 
of this model will allow scholars to examine how revolutions “sound” different than other social 
movement.  Thus, this model seeks identify the unique rhetorical functions and features of 
revolutionary movements.   
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 Section One: Identification of Grievances 
This stage coincides with Goldstone’s (1998) discussion of the causes of movements and 
Griffin’s (1969) broad stage of inception.  The “good” and “evil” of the current power system is 
slowly being identified by marginalized individuals brought together by their shared grievances. 
Griffin notes that this period may be brought on by a shocking physical catalyst. Per Goldstone’s 
model, this stage is impossible to distinguish from the initial period of social movements.  
During this stage, Stewart’s (1980) rhetorical function of altering perceptions of the past, present 
and future should be prevalent.  These grievances can include a wide range of complaints that 
may, but not necessarily, relate to economic, political and social conditions.  Additionally, 
Goldstone notes that these grievances may not initially be aggressive in their criticism of the 
state.  Thus, this stage is more closely related to Griffin’s period of inception. Scholars can 
identify this period by rhetorical markers that include calls for “the people” to come together, 
uniting calls to resist the status quo and references to a brighter future for the marginalized 
population.   
 Section Two:  Initial Mobilization for Action 
The movement advances to its next stage of development as it begins to mobilize its 
followers for action. Here Goldstone (1998) is still unable to distinguish between a social 
movement and revolution. This stage continues to align with Griffin’s (1969) inception model.  
It’s clear that the movement has entered this stage when it begins to enact three of Stewart’s 
(1980) functions. These rhetorical functions may happen gradually in a staged progress or 
simultaneously.  Regardless, the movement will employ rhetoric that seeks to alter the 
perceptions of the defined opposition.  The rhetoric of the movement must also function in this 
stage to prescribe action and to mobilize individuals to carry out said actions. Again, it’s 
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important to note that initially the movement may not be organizing against the state or an entity 
of the state.  In fact, Goldstone (1998) identifies this period as one of mobilization for a change 
in policies or attitudes.  In this way, the initial rhetorical functions need not be tailored from 
Stewart’s original discussion.   
As Stewart (1980) describes, the movement must rhetorically strip the opposition of their 
legitimacy and positively alter the self-perception of supporters. Scholars can look for rhetoric 
that describes supporters in terms of moral goodness while labeling the opposition as oppressive 
and evil. Supporters may reject old labels and take up new identities that indicate their ability to 
force change.  Next, the movement must outline a course of action (Stewart, 1980).  Scholars 
should identify instructions of who should do what and how it ought to be done as an expression 
of this type of rhetoric.  An example of this rhetoric would include plans for a rally or protest. 
This rhetorical function may result in inter- and intra-movement conflict that creates various 
fractions of the movement.  Finally, the movement must use rhetoric to mobilize for action.  
Here, supporters are united and organized to carry out the movement’s course of action.  Markers 
of mobilizing rhetoric include messages crafted to convince followers that victory is viable and 
foreseeable in the near future.  Scholars can look for rhetoric that highlights the unique 
opportunity for change and calls supporters to act before the moment passes. 
 Section Three:  State Response – Distinction Occurs 
All three scholars agree that the rise of a counter-movement is critical to the development 
of a social movement. For Griffin (1969), this is the final characteristic of the inception period.  
Once the movement generates conflict with the existing order, as represented by counter-
movement, the social movement can gain public notice. For Griffin, this conflict is a dialectic 
entanglement between the movement and the counter-movement.  Cathcart (1972) expands on 
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this conflict in his explanation of dialectic enjoinment.   Essentially the two groups engage in a 
rhetorical battle that generates drama and allows for the movement to progress. Goldstone’s 
(1998) model is more specific about the requirements of the counter-movement.  For a revolution 
to develop, the state must emerge as the counter-movement. Thus, a defining feature of 
revolutions is the dialectic enjoinment between the revolution and the state.  This is not to say 
that the initial purpose of the movement was directly against the state but merely that the state 
finds the need to respond.  An adaptation of Goldstone’s (1998) three potential types of state 
responses and the resulting outcome allows for the rhetorical identification and examination of 
response. 
First, the state can produce a mild response.  The use of the label “mild” does not indicate 
that the state must be indifferent to the movement, but instead that its response legitimizes the 
collective action as a social movement.  A mild response from the state is within the expected 
behavior of the regime and does not require the state to reassert its legitimacy as a means of 
justifying its actions.  In essence, this is a “business as usual” response from the state.  Rhetorical 
critics utilizing this model should be sensitive to the historical context of the state’s action in 
determining if a rhetorical response fits this definition of a mild response. If a state responds in a 
way that recognizes the movement as a legitimate expression of citizens, then the movement will 
continue as a social movement.  An example of this legitimizing state response might include the 
state offering to meet with movement organizers to hear out their demands.  The progression the 
resulting movement fits within Griffin’s (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) original models. 
The second available state response is a strong targeted repression that eliminates the 
movement from the public sphere.  Here Goldstone (1998) explains that the state rejects the 
legitimacy of the movement. Goldstone provides examples of the physical actions that a state 
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enacting this response will take including violent crackdowns and the imprisonment of 
supporters.  These attacks must be both targeted and viewed as a legitimate expression of 
governmental authority. Goldstone explains these requirements are necessary for the public to 
accept the actions of the state and to avoid generating sympathy for the targeted movement. 
Johnstad (2012) notes that a perceived legitimate state will seek to frame the actions of a 
movement as a threat to the public. Thus, the state seeks to fulfill the function of altering 
perceptions of the opposition. As the state is rhetorically functioning as a counter-movement, it is 
fitting that it seeks to perform the same functions laid out by Stewart (1980).  This type of 
violent action will be accompanied by state rhetoric that outlines the movement as a threat to 
public safety, frames the state’s actions protective of the public and highlights the shared goals of 
the state and the public.   
The last option for a state response is of the greatest interest to this research.  A weak or 
erratic response by the state that rejects the legitimacy of a movement in an effort to eliminate it 
can serve as a catalyst for a revolution (Goldstone, 1998).  This response is repressive in nature 
but is ultimately counterproductive.  Goldstone explains that when a state uses repressive and 
violent tactics any failure to target only the supporters of the movement damages the state’s 
perceived legitimacy and galvanizes the movement. The context of these weak or erratic 
responses hints to potential rhetorical markers of the state. Goldstone (1998) notes that state will 
attempt to justify its actions by arguing it used legitimate force.  Furthermore, this use of state 
force may be constrained by domestic or international pressures (Goldstone, 1998).  Scholars 
should look for the state to attempt to rhetorically justify its actions to multiple audiences by 
claiming that it is acting within its role as a governing force that has its citizens’ best interest in 
mind.  This rhetorical justification of force is in line with Griffin’s (1969) dramatistic approach.  
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The major rhetorical difference between a strong and weak/erratic state response is the need for 
the state to specifically acknowledge its legitimacy.  Strong state responses rhetorically assume 
legitimacy, where a weak/erratic response the state must rhetorically justify both its actions and 
its legitimacy to carry out said action. In this stage, both the state and the movement are 
projecting rhetorical visions that set “the stage” for their actions as just, moral and righteous. 
However, because these visions are in direct opposition to each other, only one vision can be 
accepted by the audience. Ultimately, weak/erratic state responses rhetorical constrains the 
movement to two choices: revolution or failure. 
 Section Four:  Radicalized Adaptation 
 Once the state produces a weak or erratic response, the movement takes on distinct 
revolutionary rhetorical features during the radical adaptation stage.  This stage is a precursor to 
Goldstone’s (1998) stage of mobilizing for changes in political regime and is related to Griffin’s 
(1969) conception of the crisis period. Wilkinson’s (1989) rhetorical functions emerge during 
this stage. In response to the state’s repressive actions, the movement, which has now taken on 
revolutionary form, will begin to appeal to moral generalities, create a binary world and attempt 
to demystify authority.  
As Wilkinson (1989) explains in order to step outside the legal and social bonds 
maintained by the state, revolutions appeal to a higher moral authority. This move is rhetorically 
unique to revolutions, as it allows for the complete dismissal of the state’s authority while 
returning moral authority to “the people”. This appeal is broad and marked by rhetorical appeals 
for the people to rise up in defense of truth, justice, reason and liberty.   
The revolution will also utilize rhetoric that creates a binary world.  This rhetoric is more 
radicalized than the rhetoric used in the first and second stages.  Here the revolution will paint 
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the world in absolute binary terms.  Wilkinson (1989) notes that this rhetoric is emotionally 
charged and confronts selected targets.  This binary world is more extreme than the divided 
world created by social movements and discusses by Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980).  Unlike 
social movements, revolutions frame inaction and indecision among the people as support for the 
state as there is no gray area.  An example of this type of rhetoric may include accusations that 
those who have remained uninvolved are condoning the abuse of the state through inaction.  
The final rhetorical marker of this stage of radicalized adaptation is the emergence of 
rhetoric that seeks to demystify authority.  Here the revolution is working against the state’s 
claims of legitimacy, especially as used for justification of the repression of the initial 
movement.  This is related to Goldstone’s (1998, p. 30) discussion about the galvanizing effect 
of poorly executed repression that “terrorizes” citizens unconnected or only loosely connected to 
the movement.  The revolution capitalizes on this poor display of state force and uses rhetoric 
that promotes the disrespect of the state and seeks to put the victims of the state at the top of the 
new order.  For this function, scholars may look for rhetoric that paints state officials as child-
like and reactionary instead of strategic.  Other messages may present the head of state as self-
appointed and fearful of the power of the people.  It’s worth noting that this stage is marked by 
the emergence and not merely the existence of Wilkinson’s rhetorical functions.  Wilkinson 
(1998) explains that this rhetoric is present during the entire revolution.  The rhetoric of 
demystification of authority even goes beyond the revolution.  After the emergence of 
Wilkinson’s (1998) rhetorical functions during the radical adaptation stage, the revolution can 
move into the radical mobilization stage. 
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 Section Five: Radical Mobilization 
 During the radical mobilization stage, the revolution revisits Stewart’s (1980) mobilizing 
rhetorical functions including altering the perception of the opposition, prescribing action, and 
mobilizing followers.  However, these functions are altered by the revolutionary nature of the 
movement.  In this second period of mobilization, the revolution will seek to alter the 
perceptions of the opposition in ways that align with its rhetorical vision of the binary world of 
moral absolutes that Wilkinson (1998) describes.  Here the revolution must, as Griffin (1969) 
details, urgently call supporters to seek salvation through the conversion of others and direct 
action.  The revolution will paint the state as an oppressive, tyrannical and evil force that must be 
overthrown.  Stewart (1980) notes that this rhetorical function must also seek to transform the 
supporters’ perceptions of themselves as capable of forcing change. This is critical as the direct 
action referenced by Griffin (1969), requires revolutionaries to risk imprisonment, physical 
injury and even death to support the revolution. In summary, the revolution’s rhetoric will 
function to alter the perception of the opposition as an intolerable presence that can be removed 
if only the people choose to stand together and revolt. An example of this rhetoric might include 
an activist justifying their personal risks as necessary while arguing if others joined there would 
be safety in numbers.  
 Stewart’s (1980) function of prescribing action is also altered during the radical 
mobilization stage.  In his initial discussion of this function, Stewart is very clear that the 
movement must lay out a detailed course of action.  In doing so, the movement risks intra and 
inter-movement conflict.  However, as Wilkinson (1989) notes, specificity is counter to the 
interests of a revolutionary movement.  The rise of inter-movement conflict favors the state’s 
position as it opens up rhetorical space for less radical alternatives than revolution.  This space 
rejects the binary world of moral absolutes that the revolution seeks to project.  Thus, in this 
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altered version of Stewart’s (1980) prescription function the revolution will become singularly 
focused on overthrowing the state.  This rhetoric is marked by a lack of engaged discussion 
concerning post-revolution policy. Instead, protesters will constantly reiterate the need to 
overthrow the state to secure an intentionally vaguely-described brighter future.  Attempts by the 
state to meet with “leaders” of the revolution will be called out as insincere attempts to divide the 
revolution.  Essentially, anyone who stands to benefit from the end of the current system of 
power can align their specific interests with the intentionally broad goals of the revolution. This 
altered function aligns with sociological discussions of revolutions that identify revolutions as 
the physical representation of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat (Borch, 
2006).  As a result, the prescribe action is intentionally short-sighted as the revolution does not 
prescribe a course of action for transitioning after the current state is overthrown. 
 In order to carry out the revolution’s prescribed action, it must rhetorically mobilize for 
action.  Obviously, this function is crucial to the success of the revolution.  Stewart (1980) 
explains that mobilizing rhetoric functions to both organize and unify supporters.  This rhetoric 
can seek to mobilize supporters to carry out a host of actions including those focused on self-
change, gaining control of societal influence and garnering attention for the movement.  For 
revolutions, it is necessary for supporters to join together in a public physical revolutionary 
crowd to confront the state (Borch, 2006). However, the rhetoric used to mobilize supporters 
must be carefully tailored as to not support the state’s rhetorical vision of the revolution as 
threatening. Once actively protesting and calling for a change in power, the revolution must 
present itself as a representation of the people and not a threat to the public (Borch, 2006).  If the 
revolution rhetorically fails to mobilize its supporters in a non-threatening way, it justifies the 
state’s action to violently repress the movement.  This is not to say that the revolution must only 
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mobilize for non-violent action. But only to say that whatever action is called for must be framed 
as a symbolic or physical attack aimed at the state, not the public. To achieve this function, 
activists might claim that violence broke out as the result of state action or that vandalism only 
targets symbols of state oppression.  Scholars should also look for welcoming invitations to join 
the revolution by activist who state all are welcome. 
The final altered rhetorical function of the radical mobilization stage requires sustaining 
rhetoric. As previously discussed, Stewart (1980) assumed that social movements usually last for 
years.  However, it is in the best interest of a revolution to overthrow the state as rapidly as 
possible.  Goldstone (1998) explains that the state benefits the longer it is able to resist a 
revolution. After initially failing to repress the movement, the state may seek to splinter the now 
revolutionary movement by offering moderate concession (Goldstone, 1998).  Additionally, the 
state possesses the resources to punish supporters of the revolution.  Thus, Stewart’s initial 
function of mobilization must be altered to meet the revolution’s need for rapid change.  Here, 
the rhetoric of the revolution will seek to emphasize victories and create symbols of martyrdom 
in order to reinforce supporter’s convictions and justify setbacks which may include significant 
human costs.  The rhetoric will continue to play to the binary world of moral absolutes as 
discussed by Wilkinson (1989) by justifying the sacrifices of supporters as heroic and acts of true 
patriotism.  Scholars should identified calls by activists that more brave patriots will die if the 
pubic remains uninvolved as indicative of this stage.  Dedications of commitment and action to 
martyrs should also be identified in this stage.  Yet, the longer a revolution exists the more 
difficult it becomes to rhetorically sustain itself.  
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 Section Six:  Conclusion – Return to Social Movements 
 The revolution may conclude either in the successful overthrow of the state or in failure 
to sustain the revolution in the public sphere. These conclusions are in line with Goldstone’s 
(1998) model.  If the state is successful, the movement may be eliminated entirely or repressed to 
the point where it only functions underground outside of the public sphere.  If the latter occurs, 
the movement will need to regain support and cycle back through the stages of this model in 
order to return to a revolutionary status.  If the model is successful in overthrowing the state, it 
will cease to function.  This is in direct opposition of Griffin’s (1969) model which extends 
beyond the success of a social movement. However, the abrupt end of the revolution is the result 
of the rhetorical functions of the radical mobilizing stage. Specifically, the revolution rhetorically 
prescribes the singular action of overthrowing the state.  Thus, once the revolution succeeds it 
cannot maintain Griffin’s period of consummation because support of the revolution splinters as 
there is no unifying rhetorical vision of what the new system ought to be. This splintering is 
supported by sociologists’ observations. If a revolutionary crowd is successful in its purpose, 
then the crowd dissolved into the multiplicity it was created from as there is no social association 
to maintain the crowd (Borch, 2006). From this multiplicity, new movements with more specific 
visions of the new system can arise.  
 The tailoring of Goldstone (1998) model into a rhetorical method is necessary to account 
for the unique rhetorical functions of revolutions that were only briefly outlined by Wilkinson 
(1989) and not discussed by Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980). Evaluating the viability of this 
tailored approach requires the careful application of this model to a case-study.  In order to do so, 
a representative rhetorical text must be selected. The remainder of this chapter provides a 
rationale for the selection of a subset of Twitter posts as well as a brief background of the socio-
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political context from which the revolution was formed. This text will be analyzed in chapter 
four alongside additional academic research examining the Egyptian Revolution.   
 Section Seven: Rationale for Selected Text 
 Tweets from Tahir: Egypt’s revolution as it unfolded, the words of the people who made 
it, is a published collection of activists’ tweets during the Egyptian Revolution (Idle & Nuuns, 
2011).  This collection of tweets will serve as the primary text for this thesis’ analysis.  This 
thesis argues that the text is an appropriate selection for the application of the model based on the 
unaltered nature of the text, the representative quality of the tweets, the measurable influence of 
the users and the concise nature of the rhetoric presented.   
The collection spans tweets posted between January 14, 2011 and February 13, 2011.  
The text contains both the date and time of each tweet.  Tweets cannot be edited once posted.  As 
a result, the content of the collection has not been altered in the ways that Borch (2006) explains 
are problematic of post-revolutionary interviews. Additionally, the text has not been translated as 
many Egyptians with access to Twitter posted in English.   Thus, the text is unaltered from the 
time it was expressed as the revolution was developing.   
Next, the authors recognize that the selection of English tweets excludes some of those 
who were active on Twitter during the Revolution (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). However by using 
English, the users gained an international audience in addition to their large Egyptian following 
(Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Additionally, the tweets routinely include informative post translating the 
chants heard in Tahrir Square and key messages of important speeches by state officials. As a 
result, the tweets preserve the rhetoric of the crowds, despite being recorded by a privileged 
activist class of Egyptians. Idle and Nuuns (2011) also acknowledge that their collection is not 
comprehensive. However, the collection does contain tweets from the Revolutions most 
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influential activists (Idle and Nuuns, 2011).  As previously discussed, the non-reciprocal nature 
of information sharing on Twitter results in it functioning more like an information-sharing 
network than a social network (Kwak, et al., 2010).  Therefore, key influencers can easily be 
identified. Based on the number of followers and re-tweets (when other users share someone 
else’s tweet with their own network), the authors selected the users who were particularly well-
positioned to influence others and disseminate information.  The selection of a collection like 
Idle and Nuuns’ (2011) allows for the rhetorical analysis of multiple influential activists and 
offers a more complete view of the revolutionary movement.  As a result, this thesis argues that 
text is representative of Egyptian revolutionary rhetoric despite discussed limitations.   
Finally, the concise nature of tweets promotes distilling of rhetorical appeals. With only 
145-characters to craft messages, activists must be direct in their appeals.  As a result, the text’s 
tweets are a blend of informative and persuasive messages. Many of the collections’ users 
utilized Twitter to report on what they saw in Tahrir Square while others constructed messages 
of solidarity and encouragement for protesters to continue to demand change.  This blending of 
messages allows for the identification of revolutionary rhetoric and an understanding of the 
context from which it was produced. As a result, the tweets provide a multifaceted projection of 
the rhetorical scene which leaders of the movement sought to create. The text is well-suited for 
the application of this model as the tweets serve as a useful unit of analysis for the evaluation of 
each stage.   
 As this methodology is concerned with the origins of revolutions that cannot be 
distinguished from social movements, this analysis is supported by the incorporation of 
additional academic texts.  These texts provide context to the socio-political setting of the 
Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution.  Furthermore, the selected rhetorical text does not focus on the 
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historical context related to the revolution’s development.  Therefore, supplemental texts are 
needed to gain a complete view of the revolution. The following academic texts will be 
incorporated into this analysis. Baron (2012) tracks the development of influential Facebook 
pages like Egypt’s April 6th Youth Movement (A6YM) over the course of several years. 
Similarly, Rane and Salem (2012) detail the development of the Egyptian political blogging 
community that served as a foundation for the dissent that encouraged the 2011 revolution.  
These texts are well-suited for this purpose because they are similarly focuses on the 
communicative aspects of the Egyptian Revolution through a social media lens.  These academic 
investigations of social media influencers of the Egyptian Arab Spring offer a fuller picture of 
the revolutionary movement.  Prior to beginning this thesis’ analysis, a brief background of the 
socio-political conditions surrounding the Egyptian Arab Spring is necessary.   
Initially, it is important to understand the Egyptian Arab Spring as a successful non-
violent collective action.  While violence did occur on both sides of the revolution, rhetoric 
played a central role in the development of the revolution. Johnstad (2012) notes the significant 
distinction between non-violent movements and armed insurgencies.  The former requires mass 
support and directly confronts the legitimacy of the state.  The latter may only represent a small, 
but powerful, segment of the population. Large, sustained mass protests (Idle and Nuuns, 2011) 
and relatively limited violence on both sides (Rane and Salem, 2012) are notable characteristics 
of the Egyptian Revolution.  The revolution easily fits Johnstad’s (2012) definition of a non-
violent movement.  Further, Johnstad (2012) notes that Egypt was one of only three non-violent 
Arab Spring movements to successfully bring down the protested regime. As a result, the 
revolution succeeded in directly confronting the state’s legitimacy through protest rhetoric.  
Thus, the Egyptian Revolution is an appropriate artifact for the application of the above model.   
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 Section Eight:  Contextual Background 
The roots of the Egyptian Revolution are as entrenched as Hosni Mubarak’s presidency 
prior to 2011.  The long and unpopular legacy of Mubarak served as rhetorical fodder for the 
revolution.  A brief history of Mubarak’s rule offers insight to the large scope of grievances 
expressed by protesters.  In 1981, President Sadat was assassinated, and Hosni Mubarak became 
the new Egyptian President.  Violence during President Mubarak’s rule started with a failed 
assassination attempt in 1995.  In the next decade, Egypt experienced a rise in terrorist attacks 
and deadly anti-government protests (BBC, 2015).  Mubarak’s rule brought about three major 
categories of challenges: political, economic and social. 
In December 2005, the Mubarak regime forced the Muslim Brotherhood, a rival political 
party linked to the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, to run as independents. The party won a record 
20% of parliamentary seats (Political Factbook, 2013). An increase in Muslim Brotherhood 
arrests by the government in 2006 appeared as a response to the party’s success (BBC, 2015).  
The crackdown on the group was so severe that it gained the criticism of Amnesty International 
in 2007 and went on to accumulate over 800 arrests in a single month in 2008 (BBC, 2015). The 
crackdown came to a head when in June 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to win any seats in 
the upper parliament despite its record gains in the 2005 parliament.  The group claimed that the 
elections were rigged and began protesting (Political Factbook, 2013).  The 2010 parliamentary 
elections were internationally criticized as a blatant attempt by Mubarak’s party (the National 
Democratic Party) to stay in power through the use of election fraud and intimidation (Johnstad, 
2012).   
Economic hardships were another major stumbling block for the Mubarak regime. 
Despite relatively healthy economic growth in the years prior to the 2011 revolution, poor living 
conditions resulted in social unrest (Veltmeyer, 2011).  The World Bank (2015) estimated 
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Egypt’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita to be $2,803.53 in 2010.  While not the worst 
economy in the region, Egypt’s poverty rate steadily increased during Mubarak’s rule with 
25.2% of the population living under the national poverty line in 2011 (World Bank, 2015).  
High unemployment rates among young people and women in rural areas, large rural-urban 
wealth disparities and a growing GDP budget deficit added to Mubarak’s economic struggles 
(African Economic Outlook, 2014). Egyptians with the education and means to seek work 
legally outside of the country did.  However, it was not uncommon for less fortunate Egyptians 
to take on the risks of illegal immigration to seek out better economic conditions (Idle and 
Nuuns, 2011).  The Egyptians’ frustration with their lack of economic opportunities flared during 
in the Spring of 2008 when food prices surged.  The national factory workers’ strike on April 6th 
involved the online participation of 77,000 individuals who pledged to strike or at least support 
strikers in their calls for higher wages (Baron, 2012).  The strike introduced tech-savy Egyptians 
to the potential of using social media as a tool for social mobilization (Baron, 2012). 
Finally, the Mubarak regime’s constant extension of the 1981 Emergency Law, which 
functionally suspended the Egyptian Constitution, generated significant social unrest among 
Egyptians.  The unpopular law allowed for indefinite detainment of citizens and resulted in 
widespread human rights violations by police and the military (Political Handbook, 2013).  Both 
organizers of the April 6
th
 workers strike (Baron, 2012) and members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Political Handbook, 2013) were arrested and tortured by Egyptian police.  State-sanctioned 
police brutality served as a major catalyst for the Revolution after police beat 28-year-old 
businessman Khaled Said to death on June 6, 2010 (Halverson et al., 2013). Graphic photos of 
Saeed’s badly mutilated body posted online by relatives galvanized activists whose online 
protests carried over into the fall of 2011. Combined, the disputed elections of 2010, an 
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increasingly poor economic, and public outrage over police brutality all put Mubarak’s regime 
on unsure ground once the Tunisia Revolution began.  Ultimately, this complex combination of 
socio-political conditions paired with the state’s inability to quell protest would signal the end of 
Mubarak’s 30-year reign.  
 The following chapter applies the tailored methodology to analyze the 2011 Egyptian 
Arab Spring Revolution.  This rhetorical analysis will investigate the revolutionary movement 
for the seven rhetorical stages of revolution development and realization.  This analysis focuses 
primarily on a collection of Egyptian activists tweets and secondarily on supplemental academic 
research. Following the analysis, the final chapter of this thesis will discuss implications and 
areas of future research.  
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Chapter 4 - A Rhetorical Movement Analysis of the Egyptian Arab 
Spring Revolution  
This analysis stays true to the compact and informal nature of Twitter and the tweets.  All 
tweets appear in their original and complete form.  The posts appear as posts with no alterations 
to spelling or grammar.  All of the tweets also appear in chronological order in an effort to stay 
true to the sequential nature of the model.  The users have been identified by their Twitter handle 
(username) and provided name.  As the model is rhetorical in nature, this analysis is not 
necessarily concerned with the influence or degree of dissemination of the analyzed tweets.  
Instead, the analysis utilizes the tweets to illustrate the model by providing evidence of 
revolutionary rhetoric.   
The chapter is divided into nine sections beginning with a brief overview of the 
conditions and events leading up to the early stages of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The 
following seven sections include the sequential stages of the proposed model. These stages 
include: (1) The identification of grievances, (2) the initial mobilization for action, (3) the state 
response, (4) the radicalized adaptation of purpose (5) the subsequent mobilization for revolt, (6) 
the conclusion.   
This chapter applies the theoretical model to a real-world context in hopes of gaining 
insight into the rhetorical functions of revolutions.  The successful application of the model will 
provide answers to these research questions: How do revolutions rhetorically function? Are 
revolutions rhetorically unique from other types of social movements? After the conclusion of 
this analysis, the final chapter of this thesis addresses critical and methodological implications 
for social movement rhetoric. 
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 When analyzing Egypt’s Revolution as a movement, it is critical to understand it in the 
larger context of the Arab Spring.  Fraudulent elections, a sinking economy and widespread 
police brutality contributed to Egypt’s revolution. However, the Arab Spring’s first revolution in 
Tunisia also played a major role in setting the stage for Egypt’s revolution. The Tunisia 
Revolution was sparked by the self-immolation of 26-year-old street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi 
on December 17, 2010 in protest of police harassment against him (Halverson et al., 2013).  
Bouazizi died on January 4, 2011 from the incident but his identity as a martyr of the Arab 
Spring lived on through viral videos, Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags (Halverson et al., 
2013). The similarities between Bouazizi and Egyptian Khaled Said, whom police beat to death 
in 2010, were not missed by Egyptian activists. By the time the Tunisia protests toppled the 
regime on January 14, 2011, Egyptians and activists in Algeria, Libya, Yemen and Jordan were 
already tuned-in and hopeful for similar change across the region (Johnstad, 2012).  The 
Tunisian Revolution helped galvanize Egyptian activists to capitalize on similar socio-political 
conditions that many agree were as ripe for revolution (Baron, 2012; Idle & Nuuns, 2011; and 
Johnstad, 2012).  Moreover, the Tunisian Revolution also set forth a guide for toppling an 
entrenched regime through the use of social media and mass peaceful protest.  With an 
appreciation for Tunisia’s influence on the Egyptian Arab Spring, the primary text can be 
analyzed. 
 Section One: Identification of grievances 
 As a review, the first stage requires that marginalized individuals come together through 
shared grievances.  Here the rhetoric should function to alter perceptions of the past, present and 
future for the purpose of identifying the “good” and “bad”.  As previously mentioned, this 
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rhetoric will be marked by calls for “the people” to act and promises a brighter future for 
followers.  Lastly, this rhetoric may be brought on by a shocking physical event. 
    The Egyptian Arab Spring sought to build on the momentum from the Tunisian 
Revolution.  Previous Egyptian social movements failed to transfer mass online support into the 
streets (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  When movements were able to organize in the streets, police 
crackdowns brutally extinguished calls for change (Baron, 2012).  Thus, a variety of social 
activists and already established social movement groups shared a common interest in organizing 
against the police and the Emergency Law that empowered the agency.  Grievances regarding 
police brutality weaved together with the revolutionary spirit of the region as demonstrated by 
@tarekhalaby’s tweet.  
@tarekhalaby, Tarek Shalaby, Jan 14 
“WE WILL FOLLOW! RT @SultanAlQasemi: Tunisians are the heroes of the Arab 
World. 
 
Even with the following sample of selected tweets from the text, the first stage of the 
model is evident.  Obviously, marginalized Egyptians were brought together by the fall of the 
Tunisian government that was similar to their socio-political climate.  By promising to follow 
and praising Tunisians, @tarekhalaby’s rhetoric functions to alter the perceptions of the present 
and future.  In the present, Tunisians are heroes not only within the confines of their newly 
liberated country but also throughout the entire Arab world.  Thus, those who seek widespread 
change should not only be lauded in the present but also followed in the future. 
Praise for Tunisian revolutionaries quickly turned to criticism of Egyptians’ tendency to 
only mobilize online as indicated by @amuchmoreexotic’s tweet.   
@amuchmoreexotic, Ben, Jan 14 
I don’t understand how the people of Tunisia overthrew their government without me 
signing an e-petition or changing my Twitter avatar. 
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Here the rhetoric functions to alter perceptions of the past.  It suggests that the failures of 
previous Egyptian social movements were not due to the lack of activists’ offline commitment.  
Instead, the tweet suggests that past failures could have been avoided if Egyptians would have 
been willing to take their online support to the streets.  Even as critical as @amuchmoreexotic’s 
is, the message suggests the potential for future success through following Tunisia.  
Three days later, marginalized Egyptians were pulled together again when three separate 
individuals set themselves on fire to protest police actions (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). On the surface, 
the tweet from @gsquare86 appears primarily informative.  However, her use of all caps and 
Tunisian related hashtags promotes the rhetoric of grievance.   
 
@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan. 17 
“A MAN IN #EGYPT SET HIMSELF ON FIRE CHANTING AGAINST STATE 
SECURITY IN FRONT OF PARLIAMENT AT 9:00AM TODAY #sidibouzid 
#Revolution attempt? 
 
The capital letters communicate shock and outrage. The hashtags #sidibouzid and #Revolution 
link the unidentified man’s actions to the Tunisian city where Mohamed Bouazizi became a 
martyr for his country’s revolution.  The Egyptian man’s grievances involving police brutality 
were so severe that he chose to knowingly sacrifice his life to protest.  The empathy felt by 
witnesses help unite those sympathetic to the man’s anti-police brutality protest.  As the model 
predicts, marginalized individuals are pulled together by shared grievances all while slowly 
identifying the “good” and “bad” in the world around them.  
 The activist continued to meet the requirements of this stage by producing rhetoric that 
sought to alter the perceptions of the past. 
 
@3arabawy, Hossam, Jan 17 
people r setting themselves on fire. I suggest they burn down police stations and torture 
factories instead. 
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 @monasosh, monasosh, Jan. 18 
There is something incredibly sad abt ppl setting themselves on fire in a fatal 
hopeful/desperate attempt to be heard! 
  
Both @3arabawy and @monasosh engaged in perception altering rhetoric.  By 
suggesting that police stations and torture factories deserve to be burned instead, @3arabawy 
highlights past police actions as the cause for the present tragic protests.  Thus, the future is one 
where police brutality and torture will not be tolerated.  Note that the tweet also includes the 
word “people” instead of protester, activist, radical or terrorist.  By viewing those sacrificing 
themselves as Egyptian people citizens are invited to see their grievances in the protest act.  
Finally, @monasosh’s tweet highlights the “badness” of the current climate that demands such 
extreme protest.  However, the tweet’s rhetoric also subtly suggests that the sacrifice opens the 
door for “the people” to be heard.  Thus, police brutality was being protested by “the people” and 
not just the three who radically protested. 
 As demonstrated by the selected text, the start of the Egyptian Revolution clearly meets 
the requirements laid out in the first stage of the model.  Activists drew from two shocking 
catalysts, the Tunisian Revolution and the self-immolation protests in Cairo, to air their 
grievances with the state of police brutality in Egypt.  The rhetoric employed subtly identifies 
those who are willing to physically protest as “good” and representative of “the people.”  
Similarly, online-only activists are chastised for not be willing to take to the streets to protest the 
“badness” of the state of police brutality in Egypt.  Having fulfilled the rhetorical requirements 
of this stage, the movement advances to the next stage of development. 
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 Section Two: Initial Mobilization for Action 
 Here the infant revolution is still indistinguishable from a social movement.  As such, the 
movement may not mobilize directly against the regime.  Three rhetorical functions must emerge 
during this stage.  The movement must strip the opposition of legitimacy and improve self-
perceptions of supporters.  For this function, the rhetoric will identify supporters as agents of 
moral goodness and label the opposition as evil and oppressive. Exchanging old supporter labels 
for new empowering labels may also occur.  Additionally, the movement must outline a course 
of action and respond to the potential splintering of the movement.  Finally, the rhetoric must 
mobilize for action.  Rhetorical markers include calls for action and promises that victory is 
possible within the near future. 
   Within six days of the fall of Tunisia, Egyptians were calling for a mass demonstration 
on National Police Day, January 25
th
, 2011 (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). In a rhetorical move of 
solidarity, activists began using the hashtag #jan25.  The #jan25 movement called for 
demonstrations across Egypt including Cairo, Alexandria and Suez.  The movement devised a 
basic strategy that involved rapid demonstrations in multiple locations in an attempt to stretch 
out the police presence and mobilize poor communities that lacked Internet access (Idle & 
Nuuns, 2011).  In Cairo, protesters converged on Midan Al-Tahrir, or Liberation Square as it 
translates to English.  The police launched rocks, tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannon 
attacks at protesters to disperse the large crowd.  Twitter users tweeted throughout the entire 
demonstration.  
 
At first glance, @monasosh’s tweets might appear to reflect a movement in confusion.   
 @monasosh, monasosh. Jan. 21 
 Did we finally settle on a tag for the 25
th
 of january? 
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 @monasosh, monasosh, Jan 24 
 What time should we be in the streets tomorrow? #jan25 
However, a closer look reveals the mobilizing function served by the hashtag #jan25.  Twitter 
uses hashtags to organize tweets.  Anyone seeking out information about the protest would 
merely need to search “#jan25” to access all public tweets using the tag. By agreeing on a 
common hashtag, the movement created a digital label for its followers.  The hashtag functions 
to connect supporters and create easy access to important information, like when and where to 
meet. The genius of this mobilization strategy is highlighted by Tufeki and Wilson (2012) 
quantitative finding that Egyptians using Twitter to talk about the movement were more likely to 
attend the first day of protests than those who used Facebook for the same purpose.  Therefore, 
the hashtag not only united and mobilized people digitally but it also encouraged and informed 
the physical mobilization of the movement.   
Additionally, the hashtag was original and contained no symbolic connection with past or 
established social movements.  The rhetorical choice is in conflict with Stewart et al.’s (2012) 
argument that social movements will seek to build legitimacy by conferring the legitimacy of 
other movements.  Emerging social movements may strive to link themselves to previous 
movements or well-known advocates.  However, Stewart et al.’s (2012) analysis focuses on 
heavily American social movements. In Egypt, where past movements failed and suffered police 
violence, Stewart et al.’s (2012) strategy would be counter-productive. The blank slate of #jan25 
created opportunity but also demanded a course of action to be defined.  
As the model predicts, the initial course of action laid out by the movement is not 
explicitly revolutionary. @adamakary’s tweets lay out clear demands and a course of action.  
Other users, like @Sandmonkey, tweeted links that directed users to web pages and blogs 
containing similar information.  While this type of informative mobilizing rhetoric fulfills the 
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required function, it also promotes splintering within the movement.  @3arabawy’s tweet 
indicates that not all agreed with the set course of action. 
 @adamakary, Adam Makary, Jan. 25 
#jan25 protester’s demands: increase in minimum wage, dismissal of interior ministry, 
removal of emergency law, shorten presidential term 
 
@adamakary, Adam Makary, Jan. 25 
#jan25 protests will take place all throughout cairo, including shubra, mohendessin, in 
front of cairo university and on arab league street 
 
@3arabawy, Hossam, Jan 25 
@shadihamid I’m not expecting a revolution today. I’m expecting protests. So let’s not 
shoot high so as not to disappoint people later. 
 
By reaffirming the debated course of action, @3arabawy addresses the disagreement 
directly.  What is curious is his choice not to include the #jan25 hashtag in his reply.  In this way, 
the movement continues to utilize the hashtag for a uniting function instead of a divisive one. 
 As the protests picked up, activists sought to strip rhetorically the police of their 
legitimacy by condemning their violent response to the peaceful protest.  This strategy of 
stripping legitimacy aligns with Stewart et al. (2012). They explain that this example of coactive 
rhetoric attacks three major forms of state power: identification, terministic control and moral 
suasion (Stewart et al., 2012, pg 68).  This rhetorical stripping takes legitimacy from the police 
and transfers it to the movement. Increasingly, the tweets referenced the protesters as peaceful in 
stark opposition to the violent oppression of the police.  Intertwined within this stripping rhetoric 
were messages of empowerment for Egyptians.  Not only were the protests exceeding police 
expectations but even organizers were surprised by the size of the demonstration (Idle & Nuuns, 
2011). As the day wore on, activists began to grasp the significance of the protests and crafted 
promises of future success. The following tweets provide evidence of the stripping and 
mobilizing rhetoric required by the model.   
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 @ashrafkalil, ashraf khalil, Jan 25 
 #Jan25 at the very least this is the biggest day of protest Egypt has seen in years 
 
 @TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 25 
our strength is in our collective action. Egyptians, Believe in Yourselves. BELIEVE IN 
US. #25jan #egypt 
 
@ashrafkalil, ashraf khalil, 
#jan25 crowd chanting ‘ salmeya’ peaceful 
 
@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 25 
Police throws rocks @demonstrtrs while we raised our arms We’re unarmed, they’re in 
full gear. We are strong, they’re weak. #25jan #Egypt 
 
@norashalaby, Nora Shalaby, Jan 25 
Those protesters that have remained in the streets despite the latest police brutality 
against us are really really brave #jan25 
 
@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, 
2. People handshaking, hugging & offering flowers to officers. Same protesters who later 
refused beating an isolated soldier. Classy. #Jan25 
 
 Tweets like @TravellerW’s frame the police not only as violent and oppressive but also 
as threaten by the peaceful people of Egypt. Other activists like @norashalaby and 
@mosaaberizing focus on framing the protesters are morally good, just and brave. As the model 
discusses, protesters threw off old labels in exchange for the label of powerful, peaceful 
protesters defending the people’s cause. Undoubtedly, January 25th, 2011 was a momentous day 
for Egyptian protesters both physically and rhetorically.  The movement’s rhetoric functioned to 
outline a course of action, strip the opposition of legitimacy and mobilize supporters for action.  
In doing so, the movement fulfills the rhetorical requirements of the initial mobilization stage.  
Before the movement can advance, the rise of a countermovement is needed.   
 Section Three: State Response – Weak/Erratic 
It is important to note that the initial protest focused specifically on police reform and 
legislative change.  The police’s actions on January 25th, 2011, though violent, do not meet the 
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rhetorical requirements of a state response. Recall that Goldstone (1998) outlines three state 
responses: mild, strong and weak/erratic.  A mild response from the state is within the expected 
behavior of the regime and does not require the state to reassert its legitimacy as a means of 
justifying its actions. A strong response engaged in targeted state repression that eliminates the 
movement from the public sphere. A weak or erratic response by the state that rejects the 
legitimacy of a movement in an effort to eliminate it can serve as a catalyst for a revolution 
(Goldstone, 1998).  In regard to the initial police actions, the protested Emergency Law gave 
police the legal power to react in the way they did. However, after the police were unable to 
contain the initial protests using familiar tactics, the state was forced to response. 
The Mubarak regime had little patience for the mass protests and began taking 
unprecedented actions to repress the protests. Initially, the regime sought to cut off 
communication among protesters. The state blocked Twitter on January 25
th
, 2011, but activists 
quickly found alternative means to access the site. On the following day, Mubarak’s regime 
blocked Facebook in an attempt to quell protesters but not before the widely-supported We Are 
All Khaled Said Facebook page called for mass protests on Friday, January 28
th
, 2011 (Idle & 
Nuuns, 2011). During the work week smaller-scale protests continued, and the number of deaths 
and injuries steadily increased.  
Given the regime’s history of police violence and the continuation of the Emergency 
Law, it would seem that the state had few qualms about using force to maintain control. 
However, military force was never used in full force against protesters. It may be puzzling that 
the state did not provide a strong crushing response when initially challenged.  However, Rane 
and Salem (2012) point out that Western media coverage of the protests framed the 
demonstrations as peaceful. These depictions restrained the available options for the Mubarak 
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regime.  Specifically, a violent crackdown would force Western nations, like the United States, 
to cut political and economic ties (Rane & Salem, 2012).  Without these ties, Mubarak had little 
chance of recovering even if the crackdown was successful. The remaining options for quelling 
protesters included detaining and harassing protesters, censoring state media, stationing military 
personnel in protest areas and cutting off communication.  
The regime also attempted to rhetorically combat the movement.  Instead of using the 
rhetoric of a strong state response, the regime engaged in rhetoric that proclaimed instead of 
assumed its legitimacy. This type of rhetorical response is identified by the model as indicative 
of a weak/erratic response.  In a January 26
th
, 2011 statement Mubarak declared, “The 
Brotherhood organization is illegal, and a number of parties are exploiting the enthusiasm of 
youth to achieve chaos” (Fahim & Stack, 2011). The use of the word illegal and the attempt to 
place blame reveal a regime striving to appear legitimate.  Goldstone (1998) explains that a 
strong state response would assume its legitimacy and not feel compelled to justify it actions.  
Johnstad (2012) echoes this sentiment when he argues that the perception of legitimacy is far 
more important than the expression of it by the state.  Essentially, when a state expresses its 
legitimacy, highlights the existence of a credible challenge to the state’s legitimacy. As the 
model predicts, the Mubarak regime’s weak/erratic state response radicalized the demands of 
protesters and pushed the movement into the developing stages of revolution. 
 Section Four: Radicalized Adaptation 
 During this stage, the movement begins to generate distinctly revolutionary rhetoric.  As 
the stage suggests, the tone of this rhetoric is radicalized and far less compromising than the 
rhetoric deployed prior to state-sponsored violence.  In response to the state’s repressive actions, 
the movement will begin to appeal to moral generalities, create a binary world and attempt to 
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demystify authority.  The appeal to moral generalities subverts the legal power of the state and 
appeals to moral law to justify supporter actions.  As a result the people’s will, not the state’s, 
becomes law. Rhetorical markers of this function include calls for the people to rise up and 
defend truth, justice, reason and liberty.  The movement will also seek to create a binary world 
by eliminating any neutral space in between the revolution and the state.  Targeted rhetorical 
attacks and emotionally charged appeals rhetorically mark attempts to create a black and white 
world.  The final rhetorical function of this stage seeks to demystify all established authority.  
Here the movement must frame the state’s response as an illegitimate attack on the entire 
population.  Other markers include rhetoric that affords the state no respect and places the state’s 
victims at the top of the new order. The successful deployment of these functions transforms the 
movement into a revolution.  
As the state rolled out new repressive actions, activists became increasingly outspoken.  
The work week limited the movement’s ability to organize a mass protest in immediate response 
to the state’s actions.  Yet, the rhetoric indicates that the movement transformed into a revolution 
prior to The Day of Rage on Friday, January 28
th
, 2011.  This aligns with sociological 
perspectives that argue revolutionary crowds form long before people gather in the streets 
(Borch, 2006).  This developing revolutionary spirit did not go unnoticed by the Mubarak 
regime.  After midnight on Thursday, January 27, 2011 the state ordered a complete shutdown of 
Internet and mobile service providers (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  The move cost the Egyptian 
economy millions of dollars.  The move ultimately failed because as the rhetoric reveals activists 
had already transformed into revolutionaries committed to taking to the streets the following day. 
@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Jan 26 
The Egyptian government started to take really stupid actions that will result in nothing 
but encouraging more people to protest #Jan25 
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 Wael Ghonim’s (@Ghonim) tweet seemingly describes the stages of state response and 
radical adaptation in less than 140-characters (135 to be exact).  Ghonim, the head of marketing 
for Google in the Middle East and North Africa, was a considerable influence on the movement.  
On the 26
th
, he appeared on a popular Egyptian talk show to protest the state’s use of Internet 
censorship (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Here his rhetoric promotes a disrespecting of the state and 
alludes to the people being aware the state’s tactics to silence them. 
 As predicted by the model and Ghonim, the state’s response only galvanized protesters.  
The following tweets provide evidence of rapid escalation of violence and protesters’ rhetorical 
response following the government’s actions. 
 @mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Jan 26 
 Live bullets? FUCK YOU MUBARAK!! 
 
 @ManarMohsen, Manar Mohsen, Jan 26 
Hundreds are running into the streets because the security forces started to suddenly beat 
them with sticks. Observers and protesters #Jan25 
 
@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 26 
Beatings and shootings on Ramses streets for no fuckin reason! 
 
@3arabawy, Hossam, Jan 26 
There r calls circulating widely via SMS for protests on Friday following prayers. #Jan25 
 
 
Previous police crackdowns had been violent. But the use of live ammunition and the police’s 
inability to only target protesters provided the movement with ample evidence that change was 
necessary.  In an effort to contain the crowds, military security forces were introduced to the 
streets (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  The presence of military officers further linked Mubarak’s regime 
to the violence.  @mosaaberizing’s tweet both links the violence to Mubarak and promotes the 
demystification of authority through disrespect.  The following two tweets frame the street 
violence as evidence of state violence against all citizens. The rhetoric promotes a binary world 
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in which Egyptians must side with the protesters or with the violent state.  The movement 
continued to take on its revolutionary form the following day as demonstrated by the following 
tweets. 
 @HosniMobarak, Hosni Mobarak, Jan 27 
Habib just sent me a bbm. He says I should prepare a farewell speech for my citizens. 
Where are you guys going? #jan25 
 
@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Jan 27 
Whatever the outcome, whatever ur position, go out & join ur countrymen. These are the 
moments where history gets made.Be part of it. #jan25 
 
@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 27 
Today is Khaled Said’s birthday. We all have to go in the streets tomorrow so his blood 
doesn’t go in vain #Jan25 #AntiTorture #FreeEgypt 
 
@ManarMohsen, Manar Mohsen, Jan 27 
One of the best things about this uprising is that it’s from and for the people, not the 
parties, not ElBaradei. Keep it that way. #Jan25 
 
@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 27 
You can strike me with a bullet, but you can’t take away my dignity #EgyPolice #Egypt 
#Jan25 
 
@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Jan 28 
Pray for #Egypt. Very worried as it seems that government is planning a war cime 
tomorrow against people. We are all ready to die #Jan25 
 
The first tweet is clearly satirical and represents a significant example of the movement’s attempt 
to demystify the Mubarak regime’s authority. While Western audiences are familiar with 
satirical attacks against politicians, Egypt’s state-controlled media limited Egyptian’s exposure 
to political satire. @ManarMohsen continues this rhetorical function by condemning all 
representations of formal authority.  The tweet directly targets El Baradei, the likely opposition 
candidate for the Presidential election.  Had the movement remained a social movement, El 
Baradei’s support would have provided useful political resources.  However, as a revolutionary 
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movement, activists casted off symbols of the current state of power and rejected all established 
forms of authority.  
The tweets also sought to appeal to moral generalities. @Gsquare86 first tweet attempts 
to tie the movement’s continuation with Khaled Said’s memory. By this point, Said was widely 
regarded as a martyr of the cause (Halverson, et al., 2013).  As a martyr, Said’s legacy takes on a 
moral authority.  Thus, by honoring him, the protesters seek justice, truth, reason and liberty.  By 
hindering the protesters’ actions, the state becomes an enemy of moral law.  In her following 
tweet, @Gsquare86 references her determination to hold onto her dignity despite police efforts to 
strip her of it.  This appeal to moral generalities fulfills the required function. 
In the last functional requirement, the movement seeks to create a black and white world.  
@Sandmonkey’s tweet seeks to flatten divides among citizens and in turn create a binary world 
of citizen versus the state. The constant depiction of the state as merciless and violent encourages 
feelings of sympathy for the protesters, or “people,” who want to bring about the end of such 
treatment.  @Ghomin tweets just past midnight his concerns for the upcoming day.  His use of 
war imagery eliminates the rhetorical space for neutrality and creates a binary world.  By the 
time Egypt went offline, the movement had already transformed into a nationwide revolution. 
 Section Five: Radical Mobilization 
 As a full-fledged revolution, activists now needed to radically mobilize supporters.  
During this stage, the movement must return to the model’s original mobilizing functions that 
include altering the perception of the opposition, prescribing action, and mobilizing followers.  
Because the movement has transformed, the functions must take on new revolutionary forms. 
The revolution seeks to alter the perception of the opposition in ways that align with its rhetorical 
vision of the binary world of moral absolutes.  Thus, the state is framed as an oppressive, 
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tyrannical and evil force that needs to be overthrown. Altering perception rhetoric must also seek 
to transform the supporters’ self-perceptions as capable of forcing change in order to justify the 
significant risk involved in participating.  
 The next function will set forth a course of action focused on the sole goal of 
overthrowing the state.  Here the revolution will avoid risks of intra and inter-movement conflict 
by abandoning specific courses of action in exchange for a singular focus. Revolutionary rhetoric 
seeks to appeal to the masses and avoid divisive issues.  Rhetorical markers will include appeals 
to overthrow the state but there will also be a lack of discussion for what ought to occur after the 
revolution. To carry out the prescribed action, the revolution must maintain a non-threatening 
position toward the public in order to resist the rationalization of state repression.  Violent 
actions are likely to occur as a revolutionary crowd is destructive in nature (Borch, 2006).  
However, the revolution must frame both violent and non-violent actions as directed at and 
instigated by the state. 
 The last rhetorical requirement of this stage is radical mobilization.  As previously 
discussed the movement has already taken on an identifiable form by this stage.  Thus, the 
revolution must seek to rhetorically maintain and escalate mobilization.  The revolution must 
rhetorically counter state attempts to splinter support or appease the public through moderate 
concessions.  Additionally, the revolution must emphasize victories and hold up martyrs to 
reinforce supporters’ convictions and justify setbacks.  In order to avoid a decline in support, the 
movement must maintain a state of urgency. 
 By nightfall on January 28, 2011, Egypt’s “Day of Rage”, protesters had gained control 
of Tahrir Square after a bloody day of confrontations with state security forces. Hundreds died 
with the highest body counts being reported in Cairo (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  After police and 
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security forces were overwhelmed, protesters took to burning state vehicles and Mubarak’s party 
headquarters.  The violent scene gained international attention and further restricted Mubarak’s 
regime to produce a strong crushing response.  In an attempt to appease protesters, Mubarak 
promised to dismiss his cabinet but refused to step down (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). Army tanks 
rolled in but took no actions to break up demonstrations.  In a half-hearted effort, the regime 
announced a curfew that protesters promptly ignored (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  The state tasked the 
Army with enforcing the curfew but the Army never did so. Finally, in an attempt to promote 
chaos and frame the protest as a threat to everyday life in Egypt, the police were removed from 
the streets (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  During the following fourteen days, the regime would continue 
to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the world.  The rhetoric produced both by the 
movement and the regime is fascinating and rich for analysis.  The sheer amount of available text 
invites multiple studies.  Therefore, this analysis focuses on selective defining events and the 
resulting rhetorical response.  These events were selected based on major shifts in momentum 
and events that prompted the emergence of new rhetorical strategies and themes. 
 The Internet and mobile shutdown continued for four days. Some activists were able to 
sporadically access satellite connections of foreign media, but the majority of Egyptians were 
unable to access social media.  However, during moments of brief access activists continued to 
promote the mobilizing rhetoric of the revolution. 
 @Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Jan 29 
I have internet access from an ‘unknown’ location, the people are in MILLIONS in the 
streets and will NOT stop until MUBARAK is OUT! 
 
@monasosh, monashosh Jan 29 
Popular committees now r being formed in Alex & Cairo to protect public & private 
properties from thugs #Jan25 
 
@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Jan 29 
there’s no state at the moment, we’re governing ourselves #Jan25 #Egypt 
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@monasosh, monashosh, Jan 29 
PPl r calling to tell me that the situation is calmer in many neighbourhoods. Really all it 
need is for us to organize things within us #Jan25 
 
As protesters recovered from the “Day of Rage”, activists reported on protesters 
organizing to maintain order after the departure of the police. As the model indicates, the 
revolution must frame itself as aligned with the people’s needs.  Mubarak’s plan to scapegoat 
protesters for an ungoverned state backfired when the revolution was able to govern itself.  
Communal policing continued over the next thirteen days.  As protesters became protectors of 
communities, violence against them became even more difficult for the state to justify.   
In a distancing move, the military announced that it would not forcefully dispel the 
protest. The statement bolstered the revolution’s efforts to alter perceptions of the opposition.  
Without full army support, Mubarak’s regime appeared weak.  Additionally, with the police off 
the streets the army was the only physical representation of the state’s response.  As evident 
below, protester’s embraced the rhetorical opportunity to alter the perception of the regime. 
@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Jan 31 
word is army has permission to shoot live ammunition at protesters #jan25 
 
@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 31 
#Army major (ra2ed) I just spoke to: “even if they order us to shoot at demonstrators, I 
will not”. #Egypt #Jan25 
 
@ashrafkalil, ashraf khalil, Jan 31 
#Jan25 Army announcement that it acknowledges peoples grievances and won’t turn 
weapons on citizens is a HUGE relief. 
 
@TravellerW, Mo-ha-med, Jan 31 
General mood on the streets is “he’s started to give concessions, so he’s afraid – so we 
should press ahead until he’s gone. 
 
@Sandmonkey’s tweet, prior to the announcement, links the military to the regime by suggesting 
that the military was still seeking permission from the state.  Thus, any violence carry out by the 
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military would reflect the regime’s violent intentions. @TravellerW’s first tweet functions to 
alter the perception of the army from loyal to the regime to skeptical and questioning.    This 
rhetoric paired with the army’s promise to not use force helped calm protesters’ fears as 
expressed by @ashrafkalil.  Without the threat of military force, little was left to keep the 
revolution from growing.   
On February 1
st
, 2011, activists called for a Million Man March.  The turn-out was the 
largest to date and included protests from all ages and classes (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  The 
revolution continued to successfully mobilize despite the Internet shutdown.  More importantly, 
the revolution continued escalating. The regime switched strategies. After forceful efforts had 
failed, Mubarak’s newly appointed (and first ever) Vice-President Omar Suleiman promised to 
start talks with opposition parties (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  But the most effective strategy came 
when Mubarak announced plans to stay through the September elections but promised to not 
seek another term.  As the model predicts, the state employed rhetoric designed to splinter 
support of the revolution.  The strategy was effective in creating a sizable pro-Mubarak 
countermovement. Revolution protesters and pro-Mubarak supporters violently clashed in the 
streets of Cairo as they battled for control over Tahrir Square and the nearby Museum of 
Antiquities. 
@ashrafkhalil, ashraf khalil, Feb. 1 
Raucous pro-Mubarak rally happening right now around the corner from Tahrir. Looks 
like about seven hundred people #Jan25 
 
@3arabawy, Hossam, Feb. 2 
We r at very critical stage. The counterrevolution is out in full steam. You will collect our 
dead bodies from garbage bins if we don’t win. 
 
The battle with pro-Mubarak supporters physically threatened the revolution’s momentum. To 
counter this attack, the revolution sought to rhetorically mobilize supporters to return to the 
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streets. @3arabawy’s first tweet calls attention to the urgency of the situation by appealing to the 
binary world of life and death. 
 
@Ssirgany, Sarah El Sirgany, Feb. 2 
Just to recap, over a million demanding change in Egypt’s street yesterday. No violence. 
Today, pro-mubarak ppl are out and all out war. 
 
@Ssirgany’s tweet seeks to alter the perception of the opposition by blaming the pro-Mubarak 
forces for the intense violence.  This rhetoric also serves to maintain the revolution’s position as 
non-threatening to the public.  As the tweet suggests, the revolution is only violent when it is 
under attack.   
 
@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Feb. 2 
Every thug we confiscate we find that his I.S. says ‘police’ those r the only pro-Mubarak 
supports in #Egypt 
 
@Gsquare86’s rhetoric functions to alter perceptions of the opposition when she links the pro-
Mubarak supporters to the hated police.  Thus, she dismissed the pro-Mubarak camp as a 
representation of the people and instead holds it up as an example of the state’s willingness to 
deceive the public. 
@3arabawy, Hossam, Feb. 2 
The shabab totally evicted Mubarak’s thugs from Talaat Harb. Tahrir is still under control 
of the shabab. Long live the revolution. #Jan25 
  
@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Feb 3 
Tonight could be the defining night of our revolution. If we hold on, millions will join us 
tomorrow and there’ll be no stopping us. 
 
Finally, @3arabawy and @mosaaberizing’s final tweets attempt to justify setbacks while 
emphasizing the revolution’s hard-fought victory.  @3arabawy’s use of the Arabic word for 
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youth, shabab, also resists state media accounts that blamed the youth for the uptick in violence 
(Idle & Nuun, 2011).  Finally, both tweets reinforce the revolution’s singular course of action.  
The revolution continued to fulfill all three requirements of revolutionary mobilization 
throughout the following seven days.  However, one specific rhetorical strategy mentioned by 
the model became a hallmark of the revolution.  The death toll steadily increased as clashes with 
pro-Mubarak forces and, later, reintroduced police officers continued. An official fact-finding 
panel found that 846 citizens died during the revolution (BBC, 2011).  As the model discusses, 
martyrs may be held up as a mean to reinforce the revolution’s cause and strengthen supporters’ 
convictions.  This tactic helped the revolution make its final push to overthrow the state. 
Themes of martyrdom were present early on in the revolution. However, on February 7
th
 
2011, the martyrs of the revolution came into the national spotlight during a popular Egyptian 
talk show.  Wael Ghonim, a prominent activist and marketing executive for Google, appeared on 
a talk show to condemn the regime’s use of Internet censorship on January 26th, 2011.  Shortly 
after, security forces detained Ghonim and held him blindfolded for eleven days (Idle & Nuuns, 
2011). Upon his release, he returned to the talk show.  Ghonim gave a heartfelt interview and 
revealed himself as an anonymous administrator of the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook 
page which helped spread initial calls for protests (Idle & Nuuns, 2011).  As the host showed 
Ghonim pictures of protesters who had been killed, he broke down and left the stage.  The scene 
breathed new life into the revolution.  The following day protest surged in numbers and shortly 
after workers and students began striking (Idle & Nuuns, 2011). The revolution’s martyrs would 
remain a rallying point until Mubarak’s departure.  The following tweets indicate the rhetorical 
themes of martyrdom were expressed online and in the streets. 
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@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Feb. 7 
“Stay strong, my sons, Ramy died for you. He had no interest in politics & could barely 
buy a shirt for himself.” [2/3] #Tahrir 
 
@ManarMohsen, Manar Mohsen, Feb. 7 
Egyptians everywhere are crying with/for both Wael and Egypt. Show that you care, that 
the current state is not acceptable. Tahrir tomorrow! 
 
@mosaaberizing, Mosa’ab Elshamy, Feb. 10 
With the escalations growing, unprecedented numbers are expected to march tomorrow in 
what has been labeled ‘Friday of Martys’ #Jan25 
 
@Salamander, Sally Sami, Feb. 11 
In #tahrir with the pple of #egypt. If they were to kill us today I would die next to my 
brothers and sisters. I have no regrets. #jan25 
 
@Cer, Mohammed A. Hamama, Feb. 11 
Walking in #Tahrir, looking at faces of martyrs in their poster. A human life, a human 
dream has ended thanks to Mubarak 
 
@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Feb. 11 
Dear President Mubarak your dignity is no longer important, the blood of Egyptians is. 
Please leave the country NOW. #Jan25 
 
The revolution’s rhetoric was multifaceted on many accounts.  However, the use of 
martyr symbols and themes served as a vehicle to meet all of the functional requirements of the 
mobilization stage. For example, @mosaaberizing’s initial tweet quotes a martyr’s mother 
speaking in Tahrir Square.  Within the tweet, the opposition is framed as murderous and 
oppressive.  Simultaneously, supporters are asked to carry on (mobilize) in their efforts to bring 
an end to the current regime (course of action).  Martyr rhetoric also served a mobilizing 
function when activists label the February 11
th
 protests as the Friday of the Martyrs (Idle & 
Nuuns, 2011).  Coincidentally or not, the day also marked the end of the Mubarak regime. 
 Section Six: Conclusion - Return to Social Movements 
 Per the model, if the movement is successful in overthrowing the state it will cease to 
function.  The crowd will dissolve into the multiplicity as the necessary social association will 
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fade as the revolution fulfilled its designated course of action. From this multiplicity, new 
movements with more specific visions of the new order can arise.  
 On February 11, 2011 Mubarak stepped down and fled the country. The army took 
control of the country but promised to relinquish power once a new government was established 
(Idle & Nuuns, 2014). While protesters were ecstatic to see Mubarak go, the lack of long-term 
vision for the revolution was evident.  Even in the afterglow of the revolution’s success, activists 
debated with one another about the best path forward.  While the text does not continue more 
than two days after the revolution, the lack of unification of post-revolution protesters is 
evidence through the following tweets. 
 @beleidy, Amr El Beleidy, Feb. 11 
I cannot believe what just happened! Hosny Mubarak resigned! The army now controls 
the country! 
 
@Ghonim, Wael Ghonim, Feb. 12 
Dear Egyptians, Go back to your work on Sunday, work like never before and help Egypt 
become a developed country. #Jan25 
 
@3arabawy, Hossam, Feb. 12 
While middle class activists here on Twitter r urging Egyptians to return to work, the 
working class strikes and protests continue. #Jan25 
 
@Sandmonkey, Mahmoud Salem, Feb. 12 
The supreme military council has made its 4
th
 announcement. And it was good. #jan25 
 
@norashalaby, Nora Shalaby, Feb. 12 
Have to say, not so happy w army’s statement. Y r they keeping the old gov. in place? 
 
@Gsquare86, Gigi Ibrahim, Feb. 12 
Tahrir square gained us Mubarak to step down, now the real resistance starts in factories, 
universities, towns, & streets.level 2 
 
 As the model predicts, the revolution ceased to function rhetorically upon Mubarak’s 
departure.  That is not to say that activists stopped using revolutionary rhetoric to advance their 
ideas.  Instead, the use of revolutionary rhetoric ceased to be used to promote the revolution and 
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is now used as an appeal to promote a multitude of changes in policy and attitudes.  As indicated 
above, the class divides among Egypt’s population were quickly highlighted by the continuation 
of worker strikes across the country.  Political debates also arose immediately upon the army’s 
announcement of its transitional plans. In the days that followed previously established political 
groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood, re-emerged along with new parties (Political Handbook, 
2013).  Additionally, within two weeks of the military taking over the country’s transition, 
protest against military rule sprang up in Tahrir Square and were violently dispelled (Frontline, 
2013). Thus, the return to multiplicity meets the model’s predictions. After eighteen days of 
protests and years of build-up, Egyptians entered into a new political landscape and its revolution 
secured its place in history. 
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Chapter 5 - Methodological and Critical Implications 
 Through the application of a tailored interdisciplinary model, this thesis argues that 
revolutions invite future rhetorical study as a distinct form of social movements. This analysis 
provides insight to the original research questions.  This thesis first asked; what are the 
rhetorical characteristics of revolutions? The second asked; Are revolutions rhetorically distinct 
from social movements? This chapter will first answer the proposed research questions before 
addressing resulting implications of the analysis. 
 This analysis reveals several noteworthy characteristics of revolutions. A revolution 
produces rhetoric that reflects the socio-economic context from which it formed and reveals its 
stages of development.  Rhetorical study reveals much about the causes, catalysts, people, state 
and outcomes of revolutions. Revolutions and social movements are initially indistinguishable 
from one another.  Revolutions and social movements may form out of similar socio-political 
context and express similar grievances.  During the model’s second stage, revolutions and social 
movements mobilize through the same rhetorical functions.   It is not until the third stage of state 
response that revolutions become rhetorically distinct.  The model labels three possible responses 
for the state once it emerges as the counter-movement.  The legitimizing function of the mild 
state response allows the movement to continue as a social movement. The successful violent 
repression of the strong state response eliminates the movement from the public sphere.  Finally, 
the erratic/weak state response attempts to violently repress the movement but ultimately fails.  
This response defines a revolutionary path for the movement. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
revolutions are ripe for investigation by rhetorical social movement scholars. The rhetorical 
characteristics of revolutions and the distinction between revolutions and social movements 
further support this conclusion. 
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First, the unique dialectical enjoinment between a weak state and revolution is another 
distinguishing characteristic of revolutions. Cathcart’s (1972) discussion of dialectical 
enjoinment informs the discussion of the impact of the erratic/weak response on revolutions. For 
Cathcart, the key to distinguishing rhetorically social movements from other forms of collective 
actions is to identify the dialectical enjoinment between the movement and the counter-
movement.  For a collective action to meet Cathcart’s definition of a social movement, this 
rhetorical clash must exist.  The unique dialectical enjoinment that results from an erratic/weak 
state response distinguishes revolutions from social movements. This model borrows from 
Goldstone’s (1998) when requiring the state to emerge as a counter-movement and produce a 
weak/erratic response that proves counterproductive.  The state attempts to rhetorically justify its 
actions by proclaiming its legitimacy. In response, the model requires the movement to radically 
adapt its rhetoric. These requirements translate into rhetorically distinguishable characteristics 
that separate revolutions from other social movements.  Thus, revolutions can be distinguished 
based on the unique dialectical enjoinment between the state and the revolution.   
 Second, forward progression is an overarching characteristic of revolutions. The 
characteristic raises the overall stakes for a revolution and its supporters because the rhetoric 
cannot freely cycle between stages. This characteristic comes from an adaptation of Goldstone’s 
(1998) original discussion. Rhetorically, the revolution must progress through escalation or fail.  
As the model discusses, if the revolution fails, it must return to the beginning stages. Scholars 
can identify the stage of a revolution based on what rhetoric is present and what rhetoric still 
need to emerge.  The characteristic of forward progression distinguishes revolutions from social 
movement.  It also calls for the tailoring of Stewart’s (1980) discussion about the average 
lifespan of social movements.  He argues that social movements can take years. However, 
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because revolutions rely on rhetorical escalation to avoid failure, the longer a revolution exists, 
the less likely it is to succeed.  As a result, revolutions progress in a linear fashion and benefit 
from rapid development.  These characteristics rhetorically distinguish revolutions from other 
social movements. 
 Third, single prescribed course of action and a rapid return to multiplicity also categorize 
revolutions.  As described by the model, this feature of revolutions decreases the risk of inter-
movement conflict faced by other social movements.  The rhetoric seeks to appeal to all 
individuals that stand to gain from the removal of the state.  There is an overall lack of rhetoric 
that seeks to prescribe a long-term course of action in case the revolution succeeds. The analysis 
revealed the prevalence of this rhetorical characteristic during the Egyptian Arab Spring. 
However, this singular focus to overthrow the state limits the revolutions ability to unite 
individuals after it succeeds. Borch (2007) explains that once protesters are no longer held 
together by the revolutionary mission, they return to the multiplicity. Thus, the revolution’s 
rhetoric ceases shortly after overthrowing the state.  New social movements pick up where the 
revolution leaves off.    
The rapid conclusion of revolutions distinguishes revolutions from social movements as 
the revolution cannot enter into Griffin’s (1969) later stages of consummation, eloquence and 
stasis.  Griffin describes that during these later stages the new order takes shape based on the 
goals of the movement.  People remain united because the social movement is still functioning 
rhetorically (Griffin, 1969).  In post-revolutionary states, the opposite is true. The rapid 
dissolution of the revolution gives way to isolated individuals as the social and class ties 
established by overthrown system no longer exist. The end of the revolution creates a rhetorical 
void where the people lack a rhetorical vision of what the new order ought to be.  This 
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instability, which is discussed in great detail later on, is compacted by the revolution’s rhetorical 
function that seeks to demystifying authority. 
 Finally, the features of a revolution characterize and distinguish it from a social 
movement.  During the stage of radical adaptation, Wilkinson’s (1989) three rhetorical 
revolutionary functions emerge.  These functions promote the appeal to moral absolutes, the 
creation of a binary world and the demystification of authority.  These functions may at first 
seem related to functions of social movements. However, combine the functions creates a unique 
revolutionary characteristic.  The appeal to moral absolutes rejects all established forms of 
authority, like the law and instead appeals to the higher moral authority.  This rhetorical move 
empowers “the people” to decide what is just or not (Wilkinson, 1989).  Essentially, the function 
removes the need for the state. In social movements, the state is often needed in order to enforce 
the new order.  This is not the case for revolutions.  Next, by creating a binary world that adheres 
to moral absolutes, the revolution removes all rhetorical space for indecision.  That is to say, that 
the binary rhetoric of revolutions labels anyone who fails to support the cause as opposition 
(Wilkinson, 1989). The message is clear; join us or stand in our way.  Unlike social movements 
that may benefit from an uninvolved larger public, a revolution suffers from the indifference of 
others.  A revolution’s need for mass support is so great that it would rather risk offending some 
of the fence-sitters than fail as a result of a lack of expressed public support.   
The final function discussed by Wilkinson (1989) both characterizes the revolution and 
continues to function after the revolution’s conclusion.  Rhetoric demystifies authority, seeks to 
reverse societal values and promote the disrespect of the state (Wilkinson, 1989).  However, 
once the rhetoric of authority is unmasked in a rhetorical scene of moral absolutes, the new 
system of power lacks the rhetorical resources to live up to its promise of perfection.  While the 
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revolution may cease to function once the state is overthrow, the distrust of authority prevails.  
Recall that a rhetorical void following the overthrow of the state characterizes revolutions.  The 
return to multiplicity invites new social movements to fill this void.  However, Wilkinson (1998) 
notes that as a result of rhetorically demystifying authority, power becomes synonymous with 
persuasion in post-revolutionary states.  Put simply, a public skeptical of authority needs 
persuaded that their grievances will be addressed.  But with no respect for the rhetoric of 
authority, instability is likely to result as the public will have little respect for the new system and 
will be susceptible to the persuasion of outside groups vying for power.  Therefore, revolutions’ 
unstable rhetorical outcomes indicate a clear distinction from social movements. 
In summary, revolutions possess a variety of unique rhetorical characteristics. These 
characteristics include, a unique dialectical enjoinment between the state and revolution, a 
rhetorical requirement of forward progression, a singular-focus prescribed course of action, and a 
rapid rhetorical death that result in an unstable post-revolutionary state.  As a result, revolutions 
are rhetorically distinct from social movements.  The answers to this thesis’ research question 
align with previous scholars’ calls to develop sub-categories of rhetorical social movement 
studies (Hahn & Gonchar, 1971; Lucas, 1980; and Riches & Sillars, 1980).  The continue 
investigation of revolutions appears promising as an area from which to grow this sub-
development. Additionally, this analysis meets the call of Morris (2000) to provide insight into 
the role of human agency in collective actions like revolutions.  Having responded to the calls of 
other academics, the remainder of this chapter focuses on discussing implications and future 
areas of study. 
 The answers to the research questions highlight a variety of implications, both 
methodological and critical.  The chapter discusses three implications resulting from the above 
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analysis.  The first covers the methodological implications of regarding revolutions as a distinct 
form of social movement.  The second, probes areas of future study in post-revolutionary states 
and the chapter concludes with a discussion critical implications of state responses.  
Revolutions as a genre of social movements 
Initially, this thesis argues revolutions are a distinct undeveloped sub-categorization of 
rhetorical social movement studies.  The analysis reveals that revolutions are rich with rhetorical 
text and ripe for future exploration.  On a methodological level, treating revolutions as sub-
categorization or genre of movements generates three implications that address the values of 
failed revolutions, the need for micro-level analysis and the limitations of the applied model. 
The Egyptian revolution serves as only one example of the availability of worthwhile 
rhetoric produced by revolutions. In an attempt to evaluate the viability of every stage of the 
model, this thesis selected a successful revolution.  However, the importance of analyzing 
unsuccessful revolutions cannot be overlooked. Even failed revolutions are worthy of 
investigation as the majority of the model’s stages are entered into before a revolution is crushed 
or fails.  These completed stages reveal much about the socio-political circumstance in which the 
revolution formed.  The type of response generated by the state also indicates the perceived level 
of threat the initial movement presents to the state. Therefore, the ability of the initial movement 
to mobilize individuals and prompt a state response reveals much about the people and the state.  
Future research should not discard failed revolutions as failures may reveal more about the 
effective rhetorical strategies of successful revolutions. A greater variety of studied revolution 
will aid in developing this genre of rhetorical movement studies. 
This analysis also points to rhetorical themes in revolutions as an area for future study. 
As found in this study, the rhetoric of martyrdom emerged as a dominant theme of the 
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revolution.  Halverson, et al.’s (2013) study of Arab Spring martyr narratives argues martyrs are 
an effective catalyst for social mobilization.  Their analysis focuses heavily on the narratives of 
Mohamed Bouazizi and Khaled Said as sparks of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.  
However, this thesis reveals that martyr rhetoric was most prevalent during the later stage of 
revolutionary mobilization. 
The deployment of martyr rhetoric in the late stages of the movement is rhetorically 
risky. Stewart (1980) explains that the movement must continual sustain itself.  Doing so 
involves justifying setbacks and emphasizing victories.  While martyr rhetoric emotionally 
appeals to the public, it also highlights the loss of life as a result of the revolution and the high 
personal costs of supporter commitment. Thus, martyr rhetoric must be careful not to be 
interpreted as a warning to those supporting the revolution. Additionally, the model explains that 
the revolution must be perceived as non-threatening to the public.  If the rhetoric of martyrdom is 
misinterpreted or co-opted by the state, it can promote the view that the revolution is to blame for 
the loss of life.  This may explain why Halverson et al (2013) views martyrdom narratives as 
catalysts for mass movements instead of tools for sustained mobilization.  In Egypt, those 
responsible for Saeed’s death were easily identifiable.  But as protest size increase and death tolls 
rise, it becomes a rhetorical struggle to place blame.  Thus, scholars should explore the ways in 
which the language of martyrdom serves the required rhetorical functions of revolutions.  More 
broadly, future studies developing the genre of revolutionary movements should consider 
thematic analysis as a promising area of investigation. 
Finally, the methodological limitations of the current model hinge on its focus on the 
movement as the primary actor.  As previously discussed, Cathcart (1972) identifies dialectical 
enjoinment as necessary factor for social movements.  A revolution requires the dialectic 
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enjoinment resulting from a weak/erratic state response.  Further as Goldstone (1998) notes and 
the model adapts, the longer the revolution exists, the more likely it is to sustain rhetorical 
attacks from the state.  The model only focuses on the rhetoric produced by the state during the 
response stage.  This is a limitation as the literature suggests that both the revolution and the state 
are constantly producing rhetoric that influences the outcome of the revolution. The Egyptian 
case study reveals that the most effective tactic to repressing the revolution did not involve force 
but instead utilized rhetoric to generate a powerful pro-Mubarak camp.  A better understanding 
of how this relationship functions in a theoretical and practical sense would provide useful 
insight to the development of revolutionary movement studies.  Thus, future research should 
examine the rhetorical tactics and strategies used by states under protest.  This new research 
should include interdisciplinary viewpoints to account for the complex nature of state actions.  
Future research in post-revolution state 
As previously discussed, revolutions result in rhetorically unstable conditional. 
Wilkinson (1989) notes that the rhetorical function of demystifying authority has lasting effects 
that cannot be contained to the revolution.  He explains once the rhetoric of authority is 
unmasked in a rhetorical scene of moral absolutes, the new system of power lacks the ability to 
live up to the rhetorical vision of the revolution. As a result in post-revolutionary states, power 
becomes synonymous with persuasion (Wilkinson, 1989).  For Egyptians, the revolution 
unmasked all forms of established authority. This disregard for authority carried over into the 
transitional period led by the army.  While the army never sided with the Mubarak regime, it also 
never officially sympathized with the protesters.  As a result, rhetorical attempts to demystify 
authority were directed at the army.  The resulting distrust inhibited some Egyptians from 
trusting the army with the transition.  Smaller protests emerged days after Mubarak was removed 
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and were violently crushed by heavy military force (Frontline, 2013). This marked the start of 
nearly two years of unrest in Egypt in which Islamists, the military, secular politicians and ethnic 
groups violently clashed and vied for a say Egypt’s future (Frontline, 2013).  As explained 
above, the public, no longer united, rapidly found fault in the military’s new authority as it did 
not live up to the absolute moral perfection promised by the revolution.  As predicted by 
Wilkinson (1989), power became synonymous with these groups’ ability to persuade followers. 
Ultimately, the military succeeded when General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi won the presidency and 
remains, at the time of writing, in power.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reality of power and order 
in post-revolution Egypt is far from moral perfection promised by the revolution.  
Many regard the Arab Spring as a major step forward for the countries that were able to 
oust entrenched regimes that had often violated human rights (Johnstad, 2012).  In Egypt, the 
removal of President Mubarak was initially a global symbol of triumph for citizen-led 
democracy (Veltmeyer, 2011). However, such massive political upheaval should be met with 
caution as the modernization of states often leads to destabilizing conditions.   These de-
stabilized conditions can serve as breeding grounds for extremist movements and ethnic conflict 
(Kornhauser, 1959).  The demystification of traditional power structures results in the 
undesirable rhetorical outcomes of a revolution.  The long-term effects of demystifying authority 
rhetoric highlight implications for the rhetoric of extremist movements and ethnic conflict.   
 Extremist movements and ethnic conflict rely heavily on the rhetoric of grievance and 
mobilization.  Political scientist William Kornhauser’s (1959) theory of modernization’s 
destabilizing effects argues that the disturbance of traditional elites systems threatens 
individuals’ sense of security.  This insecurity often results in religious and political extremism 
in the form of mass movements.  In Egypt, the established Muslim Brotherhood returned to 
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power when the party’s presidential candidate Mohamed Morsi won the election in June 2012 
(Frontline, 2013).  As the first Islamist and civilian leader, Morsi’s presidency threatened secular 
Egyptians and the military.  A little over a year later the military removed Morsi and arrested 
high-profile party leaders. Pro-Brotherhood protests sprang up and were violently extinguished 
by the military.  Over 1,000 protesters died as a result of the excessive military force used 
(Frontline, 2013). Removed from the political sphere and galvanized by the deaths of protesters, 
some supporters turned to extremist actions. In September 2012, a militant Islamist group in the 
Sinai region claimed responsibility for a car-bomb assassination attempt on Egypt’s Interior 
Minister (Frontline, 2013).  At the time of writing, Egypt’s current regime still faces the constant 
threat of extremist actions. In turn, those still supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamist groups face the threat of extreme actions taken by the military against them.  Future 
research in this area should explore the connection between revolutionary rhetoric and the rise of 
extremism in post-revolution states.  Wilkinson’s (1989) observations along with Kornhauser’s 
(1959) political science theory of modernization’s destabilizing effects serve as useful additions 
to the available body of literature. 
Post-revolution states are also susceptible to an increase in ethnic identity rhetoric that 
promotes ethnic conflict.  Ethnic identities forms when individuals share a common inherited 
culture, racial similarities, a common religion, belief in a common history and ancestry, and a 
strong psychological sentiment of belonging (Taras & Ganguly, 2006).  The rhetoric of ethnic 
mythos largely maintains these identities.  Additionally, ethnic awareness and ethnic division 
increases as a result of the previously described instability resulting from revolutions 
(Kornhauser, 1959).  This also aligns with Wilkinson’s (1989) observations as the lack of 
respected authority promotes power struggles among groups.  As this analysis reveals, instability 
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and a rhetorical void categorize revolutions. As a result, post-revolutions states are at an 
increased risk of ethnic conflict (Kornhauser, 1959).  Egypt, a largely ethnically homogenous 
state, saw an uptick in ethnic violence against minority Coptic Christians after the revolution 
(Political Handbook, 2013). Thus, the analysis’ identification of characteristic instability 
following a revolution relates to the conditions Kornhauser (1959) identifies as favorable to 
ethnic conflict. The applied model is unable to address this area of study as the final stage of the 
model involves the death of the revolution and the return to multiplicity.  Future studies should 
explore how the rhetoric of revolution aids or hinders the development of ethnic identities.  
Additionally, Kornhauser (1959) notes the importance of promoting messages of nationalism to 
lessen the influence of ethnic identities.  This observation invites future rhetorical study 
investigating how transitioning and new post-revolutionary governments can recycle the 
identification rhetoric of the revolution into a new sense of nationalism. 
Critical implications of state responses 
 Goldstone (1998) and the applied model place a heavy importance on the type of 
response generated by the state.  This aligns with Griffin’s (1969) conception of the dialectic 
enjoinment which is required for a social movement to come into the public sphere.  As 
previously discussed, Goldstone’s (1998) model lays out three types of state responses; mild, 
weak/erratic and strong.  The model requires a weak/erratic state response for the development 
of a revolution.  As previously discussed, while both responses attempt to violently repress the 
movement, the weak/erratic response sounds different than the strong response as it declares 
instead of assumes the state’s legitimacy to justify its actions. It is fairly obvious that all states 
wish to avoid the development of a revolution.  However, the two remaining rhetorical responses 
for states prompt response-specific implications. 
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 The mild response discussed by Goldstone (1998) involves the state recognizing and 
thereby legitimizing a movement. A mild state response aligns with the rhetorical discussion of a 
countermovement/opposition (Griffin, 1969; and Stewart, 1980).  This conflict is necessary and 
beneficial for the movement to enter into public consciousness.  More importantly for this 
discussion, Goldstone (1998) explains that a mild response that accepts the movement’s 
legitimacy pushes the movement toward limited protest, negotiation and a focus on legislative 
and attitudinal change.  This type of response is most often generated by democratic states 
(McAdam et al., 1996). This produces promising and concerning implications for democratic 
societies. 
Initially, as democratic states are more likely to legitimize social movements through 
mild responses, movements can be viewed as a preferred method of societal change. Mild 
responses provide a rhetorical space in which the public can make the state aware of their 
grievances.  In democratic societies, the participation of the citizenry is held up as a defining 
feature of the political system (Goldstone, 1998). Citizens of democratic states are both 
empowered by movements and protected from the destabilizing effects of a revolution.  Through 
mobilization, citizens actively participate in democracy. While the conflict produced by a 
countermovement is still necessary, it is less likely than a revolution to result in violent physical 
conflict.  As a result, citizens can address their grievances through less physically violent means.  
This relative statement is not ignorant of the physical and symbolic violence that can occur 
during social movements.  However, this thesis argues that the physical violence that results 
from social movements is, in general, on a smaller scale than revolutions. Thus, democratic 
regimes are insulated from the threat of revolution as less violent means for change are readily 
available to the public.  
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The promotion of social movements through a mild response is also in the best interest of 
democratic states but perhaps for more sinister reasons.  Goldstone’s model (1998) argues, and 
Griffin (1969) and Stewart (1980) agree that a state response is not necessary for the 
development of a social movement. However, some movements may confront the state with 
harsh criticisms and pressing demands for change.  When prompted to response to a movement, 
a mild state response eliminates the potential of revolution.   Thus, a state’s choice to legitimize a 
social movement opens up rhetorical space to negotiate, placate, splinter and rhetorically attack 
the demands of the movement without the use of violence.   
Goldstone (1998) points out that the state has far more physical resources available to it 
than the movement.  Griffin (1969) and Stewart’s (1980) discussions of movement maintenance 
further reveal the state’s upper hand when it comes to rhetorical resources.  Specifically, the 
movement may initially have more rhetorical freedom to define its rhetorical vision for the 
future.  However, the state generally has more access and control over media and dissemination 
tools. Therefore, the state has more options to counter the movement’s rhetoric and interfere with 
its goals.  Furthermore, Halverson et al (2013) note democratic states that publicly condemn 
human rights violations abroad, risk severe political backlash if the state produces a violent 
response.  By tolerating social movements the state benefits from fractured interests. In Egypt, a 
critical mass of public support was needed to overthrow the regime.  Similarly, movements 
seeking sweeping governmental change in democratic societies require a near majority of public 
support.  In a democratic society, the more public support a social movement gains, the more 
influential it becomes. Thus, by acknowledging the grievances of supporters through a mild 
response, the state eliminates the likelihood of long-held grievances accumulating into a more 
powerful movement later on. Ultimately, the state maintains its position of advantage through a 
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mild response that limits the movement’s ability to produce revolutionary change.  In this way, 
democratic states are still insulated from revolutions.  However, the democratic state also gains 
an advantage over citizens’ most promising tool for change. 
This thesis supports Goldstone’s (1998) assertion that democratic states are less likely to 
experience the violence that characterizes revolutions. However, citizens of democratic states 
should be made aware of the rhetorical and physically advantages held by the state to resist 
change.  Future research should address the ways in which democratic states rhetorically respond 
to social movements and the effective strategies used by movements to overcome resource-
related state advantages.  Additional research may also explore the context and strategies of 
movements capable of gaining mass public support.   
The remaining state response involves the violent repression of a movement. If a social 
movement meets strong state repression, the movement will be crushed entirely or driven 
underground and become ineffective.  The state will then justify its actions by declaring the 
movement a threat to the public.  By doing so, the state assumes its actions as legitimate and 
leaves little room for the public to question its authority on the matter. Goldstone (1998) 
identifies repressive regimes as most likely to violently eliminate dissent.  This response is risky. 
If successful, the state may face political backlash from the international community.  For 
example, had Egypt successfully invoked a strong response, its ally, the United States, would 
likely have condemed the state’s actions and called for reform and restraint in the future. If the 
attempted strong response fails, it transforms into a weak/erratic response capable of galvanizing 
a revolution.  The high-risk of a strong response incentivizes the use of rapid, overwhelming 
violence against movements that the state will later rhetorically justified.  Johnstad (2012) 
supports this conclusion when he notes that a regime’s perceived legitimacy is synonymous with 
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its political power.  Strong responses may result in international backlash.  However, these 
bridges can be rhetorically rebuilt between countries.  What cannot be reestablished once 
damaged is the state’s perceived legitimacy.  As noted above, the state opens up rhetorical space 
for critique and debate when it is forced to proclaim its legitimacy as a justification for its violent 
actions against citizens.  Future research should explore the ways in which states respond to and 
limit debate regarding state legitimacy and authority. 
First, it is important to note here that Egypt’s state response was violent and did result in 
considerable human loss.  However, the state failed to generate a crushing response, and the 
revolution was able to survive.  Halverson et al. (2013) note that international pressure may have 
decreased the willingness of the Mubarak regime to use force.  The success of the revolution in 
Egypt inspired other revolutions in the Middle East North African (MENA) region (Idle & 
Nuuns, 2011).  However, both the Egyptian military and the entrenched regimes abroad took a 
different lesson from the revolution: Use more force sooner.  As discussed above, the Egyptian 
military began violently eliminating dissent weeks after the fall of Mubarak.  Even though many 
view Egyptian Arab Spring as a victory for democracy, it seemingly replaced a regime hesitant 
to use extreme violence, with one that had few qualms about crushing dissent. Additionally, the 
rhetorical pressure of international influences was reduced as the need to avoid an ungoverned 
state overtook calls for human rights to be respected.  Even the United States, a leader in calling 
for the international respect of human rights (Halverson, et al., 2013), provided little incentive to 
avoid violence. After the military broke up protests and killed 600 people on August 14, 2011, 
United States President Barak Obama publicly condemned the military’s actions (Frontline, 
2013).  However, the 1.3 billion of U.S. military aid to Egypt was not threatened (Frontline, 
2013) as Obama declared in the same statement, “America cannot determine the future of 
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Egypt.” Obama rhetorically maintained the U.S.’s position on human rights while simultaneously 
expressing no desire to become involved with Egyptian affairs. With no risk of political 
consequences, the military continued to rule with an iron fist. 
Johnstad (2012) explains the theoretical incentives for producing a rapid, strong response. 
His study reveals that the success of non-violent protests, like Egypt’s, can be predicted based on 
perceived levels of regime legitimacy.  States with low perceived legitimacy as more susceptible 
to revolutions as political legitimacy is indicative of power (Johnstad, 2012).  As the model 
explains, strong responses by the state rhetorically assume legitimacy in removing the protesters 
as a public threat.  However, a weak/erratic response results when the state’s actions are viewed 
as an attack on the public.  Therefore, the deployment of violent repression is most effective 
when the state can target a smaller number of protesters.  This rapid response lessens the 
likelihood that the movement will be able to survive and develop into a revolution.  Furthermore, 
those uninvolved with the movement are likely to view the state’s action as legitimate or at least 
as business as usual (Goldstone, 1998). Returning to Johnstad (2012), states capable of 
maintaining high-perceived legitimacy are less likely to experience revolutions.  Thus, strong 
state responses help rhetorically maintain a state’s perceived legitimacy and protect it from being 
overthrown.   
The silver lining for proponents of human rights and communication scholars may rest on 
the power of social media to organize movements. Of course, the following discussion only 
applies to states where citizens have access to the Internet and social media.  However, even 
relatively small online populations, like Egypt’s (Political Handbook, 2013), can help spark 
revolutionary change.  While scholars agree that social media did not cause the Arab Spring, 
many agree that social media did promote the dispersion of ideas (Baron, 2012; Halverson et al., 
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2013; Hamdy & Gomaa; 2012 Lotan et al., 2011; and Tufeki & Wilson, 2012).  This dispersion 
may allow for social movements to perform the model’s initial stages of grievance identification 
and initial mobilization in the safer online settings. The available research supports the viability 
of this implication as social media connect like-minded individuals and invite the expression of 
commitment. As previously discussed, this expression is significant based on the principles of 
consistency and commitment.  Ciadini (2001) explains that even small verbalizations of 
allegiance generates pressure internally and externally to behave in line with that commitment.  
In Egypt, Tufecki and Wilson (2012) found “controlling for other factors, social media use 
greatly increased the odds that a respondent attended protests on the first day.”  Thus, online 
expression functions rhetorically as an act of identification and commitment which is required by 
the model’s first two stages. 
Unfortunately, the model also requires a degree of survivable violence carried out by the 
state during the period of response. Clearly, Griffin’s (1969) discussion of necessary conflict did 
not include the death of civilians.  However, Goldstone (1998) and this model recognizes the 
violent climate in which a revolution functions.  In order to survive the initial state response, 
supporters may return to online communities.  The model requires forward rhetorical movement 
as the only alternative to failure.  As a result, time spent radicalizing and remobilizing online 
should not be viewed as an alternative to returning to the streets.  However, the movement may 
avoid continued violence by using social media as a means of gaining international attention.  
The state response may result in the revolution entering the public sphere on an international 
scale.  Halverson et al.’s (2012) findings suggest that international pressure can lessen the use of 
violence by a regime. Additionally, online attacks against the regime’s legitimacy may also 
decrease the regime’s level of perceived legitimacy.  This decrease increases the likelihood of 
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success for protesters (Johnstad, 2012). More research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness and 
viability of such rhetorical strategies. 
This thesis asked the following two research questions: How do revolutions rhetorically 
function? Are revolutions unique in rhetorical function in regards to social movements?  
Through the review of available research, the development of an interdisciplinary rhetorical 
model of revolutions, a case study of the Egyptian Arab Spring Revolution and a discussion of 
methodological and critical implications, this thesis can developed the necessary insight to 
answer these questions.  Revolutions are rhetorically distinct social movements that take on 
radically modified rhetorical functions in hopes of overthrowing the state.  The development of a 
revolution from its social movement origins is dependent on a weak/erratic state response. This 
thesis provides a staged model for the future exploration of revolutions as a genre of social 
movements as well as several areas for future research. The unpacking of revolutionary rhetoric 
reveals much about those who participate in revolutions and the societies in which revolutions 
occur.  Therefore, the continued investigation of revolutions by rhetorical scholars has as much 
to offer the discipline as it does the people living under repressive regimes who dream of change.  
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